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COORDINATING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Harold H. Bruff*
Two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton warned that a system
of "[t]hirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same
causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from
which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed." 1 To-
day, Hamilton's hydra is a reality in administrative law. Federal
agencies implementing statutory programs confront thirteen courts
of appeals 2 that wield final review authority in all but a handful of
cases. The interaction of centralized executive agencies with decen-
tralized reviewing courts has pernicious effects on the behavior of
all the main participants in the system: private litigants, agency of-
ficers, and federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices).
These effects include private forum-shopping, agency nonacquies-
cence in court orders, and distortions in judicial perspective on ad-
ministrative problems.
The complexity of our government makes sound remedies for
these ills difficult to prescribe. The effects on administrative law of
the interaction of agencies and lower federal courts can be as ob-
scure as they are profound. For that reason, organizational change
often produces unintended influences on government operations.
We must honor the old medical precept: "First, do no harm."
* I thank Professor Peter Strauss and Circuit Judges Patricia Wald and Alex
Kozinski for their probing criticism of drafts of this Article. The editors of the UCLA
Law Review have been unfailingly gracious and helpful throughout the progress of this
Symposium.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 500 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). The
cure, he thought, was to make "the judicial power of a government... coextensive with
its legislative."
2. These are the eleven numbered circuits, the D.C. Circuit, and the Federal Cir-
cuit. 28 U.S.C. § 43 (1988).
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This Article begins by describing the tradeoffs associated with
varying degrees of court decentralization. Dispersal of judicial au-
thority fragments our national law and distorts judicial perspective
by showing the judges small parts of large problems. Concentration
of judicial authority, however, eliminates desirable distance between
the branches and threatens the integrity of the courts by altering the
appointments process.
There are five possible methods to calibrate the centralization
and specialization of judicial review in search of the best accommo-
dation of the competing concerns. Any of them could reduce the
present disadvantages of decentralization without increasing
Supreme Court intervention. First, the creation of a specialized
Administrative Court could centralize this portion of the appellate
docket. Second, the distribution of appellate jurisdiction among the
regional circuits by subject matter could unify national law in a de-
centralized system. Third, the District of Columbia Circuit could
achieve partial uniformity in the law by performing en banc review
of panel decisions in other circuits. Fourth, a national panel of fed-
eral judges could review administrative law decisions of the regional
circuits. And fifth, a national panel could allocate en banc review of
appellate decisions to particular regional circuits. I recommend the
last of these options. I propose the designation of a group of federal
judges to decide which panel decisions need further review and to
initiate limited en banc proceedings (usually of panels of seven
judges) in particular regional circuits. The decisions of the en banc
panels would be binding nationwide unless the Supreme Court
chose to review them.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF JUDiCIAL REVIEW IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
A. Allocation of Administrative Review Authority to the Courts of
Appeals
The welter of agencies that we now call the "administrative
state" evolved contemporaneously with their principal reviewing
courts, beginning in the closing years of the nineteenth century.
Administrative lawyers often date the birth of their field from the
formation in 1887 of the first independent regulatory agency, the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1891, creation of the courts
of appeals made "the first structural modification in the federal judi-
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cial system since its creation a hundred years before."' 3 The
Supreme Court had lost its capacity to review most federal court
decisions.4 Lower federal judges had been, denounced as "the
greatest despot[s] of the land"5 because of the de facto finality of
their rulings. Creation of the intermediate appellate courts allowed
routine correction of trial court errors. Since only the Supreme
Court could create uniform national law, however, the new system
ultimately relied on the Court's capacity to review decisions of the
courts of appeals.
The contours of the present relationship between agencies and
reviewing courts soon emerged. Congress placed review of formal
administrative adjudication in the new appellate courts to avoid the
duplication that would attend holding trial-type proceedings in both
the agency and district court.6 Concepts of both agency procedure
and judicial review crystallized early in the twentieth century, dur-
ing a period of judicial accommodation to a new governmental en-
tity that exercised adjudicative functions formerly vested in the
courts. 7 Under pressure of judicial hostility, agency process in-
creasingly mimicked court procedure. Eventually, the courts de-
ferred to agency processes that seemed reliable and arrived at a
limited style of review that was meant to preserve both the rule of
law and agency discretion.8 They have tried to walk that line ever
since.
Passage of the broadly applicable Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) in 1946 eased direct appellate review by requiring stan-
dardized agency procedures and records.9 The APA requires each
3. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 103
(1928).
4. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 148
(1976).
5. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 80 (quoting 32 NATION 9
(1881)).
6. E.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1988)). The court of appeals was limited to issues
of law, including whether sufficient evidentiary support underlay the agency's order.
See H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Congress subsequently ex-
tended this approach to the orders of numerous agencies in the Administrative Orders
Review Act of 1950, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 2122, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); S. REP. No. 2618, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1950).
7. See Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1208-36 (1986).
8. The landmark case was Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see Bruff, Public
Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67
TEX. L. REV. 441, 466-67 (1989).
9. The APA's trial-type adjudicative procedures apply when the agency's statute
provides for adjudication "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 5
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agency order to rest on the exclusive basis of a record that is accom-
panied by findings and conclusions of fact, law, and policy.10
Agency rulemaking now frequently receives direct review in the
court of appeals as well. I I Modem "notice and comment" rulemak-
ing under the APA generates an administrative record that can be
accorded appellate review. 12 Indeed, as agencies have turned in-
creasingly to rulemaking to administer complex modem statutes
promoting public health and safety, appellate litigation over rules
has taken center stage in administrative law.
Still, important roles remain for trial courts. Review usually
begins in district court for "informal" adjudications, a broad
residual category of case-by-case decisions that often lack any pro-
cedure specified by statute.13 Because the Supreme Court has held
that these informal actions must be reviewed on the administrative
record, 14 direct appellate review could occur. Yet the administra-
tive records that underlie informal actions vary in completeness. A
district court is better able to supplement these records when it so
desires than is an appellate court. Moreover, the courts entertain
two-thirds as many challenges to informal actions as to formal adju-
dications and rulemakings.15 Diverting these cases to the courts of
appeals would add substantially to existing caseload pressures there.
B. The Decentralization of Judicial Review
A fundamental difference in the organization of the executive
and judicial branches affects many characteristics of judicial review
of agency action. Although both of these constitutional branches
are formally centralized, only the executive can interpret statutes
with effective national uniformity. The judiciary, as it was a cen-
U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988), or when due process requires relatively formal procedures,
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1988). The court can probe both the evidentiary under-
pinnings of the agency's findings of fact and the persuasiveness of its conclusions of law
and policy. See Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 305 U.S. 613 (1938).
11. The courts of appeals often stretch their authority to review agency "orders," a
term traditionally referring only to adjudicative decisions, to include the review of rules.
See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23:3, at 133-34 (2d ed. 1983).
12. See generally Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L.J. 38 (1975) (suggesting a better way to achieve a record of rulemaking).
13. For examples of informal adjudications, see Lubbers, FederalAgency Adjudica-
tions: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B. NEws & J. 383, 387 (1984).
14. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
15. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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tury ago, is actually decentralized, once again due to the Supreme
Court's inability to review most lower court orders. There is, how-
ever, an historical irony in these otherwise similar situations. In
1891, perceptions that lower court finality fostered judicial arbitrar-
iness led to the formation of the courts of appeals. Today, as we
shall see, in administrative law a similar finality leaves the lower
courts with less power, not more, than in a centralized system.
1. The Comparative Centralization of Agencies and Reviewing
Courts
Agencies are structured hierarchically so that they can admin-
ister their statutes with national uniformity. Agency heads have the
responsibility to coordinate their various regions and bureaus to
form a single policy voice, though neither any particular agency nor
the executive branch as a whole is monolithic. 16 Although the exec-
utive branch is under the general supervision of the President, both
practical and legal responsibility for statutory decisions rest in
agency hands.17 Granted, policy may oscillate as time goes by-
administrators are buffeted by pressure from congressional commit-
tees, executive agencies, interest groups, staff members, and the
courts.1 8 Nonetheless, centralization typifies statutory admin-
istration.
In contrast, a combination of docket overload and regional di-
vision of authority has largely decentralized the federal judiciary.
At the apex of the judicial branch, the capacity of the Supreme
Court as presently constituted is essentially fixed at about 150 deci-
sions per year after full briefing and argument. 19 Because the Court
controls its own docket, its problems center more on its ability to
determine which cases require its review than on inundation with
cases it must decide. At the bottom of the pyramid, district courts
face such inundation. But because trial courts act independently of
16. Of course, a problem endemic to government is the extent to which an agency's
formal policy is actually followed in the field. Agencies employ rules, policy guidelines,
manuals, and the like in a constant effort to ensure uniform policy application.
17. See Bruff, Presidential Management ofAgency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 533 (1989).
18. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207,
227-46 (1984). These pressures are materially less for agency adjudication, with its
procedural protections, than for rulemaking. But for the principal officers of an agency,
they are never absent.
19. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1987).
11971992]
UCLA LAW REVIEW
each other for most purposes, new district judgeships can be added
fairly readily.
It is the middle, the appellate court level, that largely accounts
for the air of crisis surrounding the federal courts.20 As with the
district courts, courts of appeals lack the discretion to turn away
cases they do not wish to decide. But as with the Supreme Court,
there are structural limitations to their size. Courts of appeals are
collegial and cannot function well after they have reached a certain
size. The D.C. Circuit, currently at twelve members, is of middling
size; the Ninth Circuit, at twenty-eight, is the giant.21 Problems in
administering large appellate courts, especially for en banc proce-
dures, lead to calls for more circuit-splitting. 22 Yet adding more
circuits would exacerbate the current fragmentation of federal law.
The courts of appeals now receive over 40,000 appeals per
year.23 The caseload has risen much faster than the number of
judges-from 1960 to 1987, the caseload per judge nearly tripled.24
To handle the flood, these courts now decide almost half their cases
without oral argument and rely upon growing squads of law clerks
and staff attorneys. Able judges complain about the increasingly
bureaucratic routine, which leaves little time for reflection on the
path of the laW.2 5
Today, the Supreme Court's capacity to review and coordinate
the activities of the courts of appeals is extremely limited. In 1924,
20. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTE ON
FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS:
REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PRocEsS AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH (1989)
[hereinafter ABA REPORT] (the federal courts of appeals are absorbing the strain so
that the Supreme Court can maintain its current caseload); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE (1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT] (ex-
plaining that the number of cases in the federal courts of appeals increased more than
tenfold between 1958 and 1988).
21. In the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5098-99 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988)), Congress increased the size of
some of the circuits. The First remains the smallest, at 6, and the Ninth the largest, at
28. All others are between II and 17 in number.
22. E.g., Moore, Debating an Appeals Court's Boundaries, 22 NAT'L J. 582 (1990).
23. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1990
tables B, G-2, [hereinafter 1990 AO REPORT] (42,364 filings in all circuits, including the
Federal Circuit).
24. This paragraph summarizes the findings of the ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at
1-8.
25. E.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM 94-129 (1985);
Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV.
259 (1981); Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegial-
ity Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766 (1983).
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the Court reviewed about one in ten decisions of the courts of ap-
peals; by 1984, the proportion had shrunk to about one in 200.26
The implication is obvious-the thirteen courts of appeals are now
almost always the final deciders of federal law. Of course, many of
the cases that do not receive Supreme Court review do not merit it
and are accorded only summary attention in the couits of appeals.
But even if the fifty percent of the appellate caseload that receives
summary adjudication is removed from the calculus, the Supreme
Court reviews only one in one hundred appellate decisions. This is
a tenfold decrease from the 1924 figure, an amount that cannot be
inconsequential.
Scholars have debated whether the Supreme Court is able to
resolve all the important conflicts that arise among the circuits.
2
"
In any event, the Court's remoteness has at least two inescapable
effects. First, much time can pass while cases that present issues
ripe for decision jostle in the queue. 28 Meanwhile, uncertainty
breeds repeated litigation of the same issues in the lower courts
29
and hampers confident planning of life's affairs. Second, the Court's
receding presence as manager of its branch of government increases
slack in the system, allowing litigants and judges to treat the pros-
pect of Supreme Court review as too unlikely to affect their behav-
ior in routine litigation.30 For the judicial branch as a whole, the
capacity to articulate a coherent body of national law is vitiated.
26. Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1400, 1405-06 (1987).
27. Compare id. at 1406-07 (arguing that the Court is unable to perform this func-
tion) with S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE
102-03 (1986) (claiming the Court adequately handles the tasks); see also Strauss, supra
note 19, at 1094 n.4; Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction
in Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1251 (1989). In Special Project, An
Empirical Study of Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV.
125, 138 (1989), student researchers found that the Supreme Court eventually reviewed
12 of 56 tax cases involving some degree of conflict among the circuits.
28. M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 84 (2d
ed. 1988); Baker & McFarland, supra note 26, at 1406-07.
29. A traditional function of lower court litigation is to ventilate issues fully to aid
ultimate Supreme Court resolution. But diminishing returns soon occur as new insights
become unlikely. Modern Supreme Court cases often cite many more lower court deci-
sions than are needed to identify issues and arguments. E.g., Shearson/American Ex-
press v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 n.1 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States
Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 519 n.12 (1984).
30. For an introduction to the role of slack in principal/agent relationships, see
Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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2. Decentralization of Judicial Review of Administrative Law
To assess the Supreme Court's capacity to control the articula-
tion of administrative law, we must distinguish between procedural
and substantive issues. The Court probably does eventually decide
most of the important issues of administrative procedure.31 The
same cannot be said for important substantive issues concerning
particular programs. 32 The sheer size of the administrative state,
with its wealth of highly detailed statutes, disables the Court from
acting as the primary interpreter of legislation. In recent years the
Court has devoted about sixteen percent of its docket, or about
twenty-five cases per year, to administrative law cases of all kinds,
including constitutional challenges to the statutes. 33 If the adminis-
trative law cases in the courts of appeals are halved to eliminate
summary dispositions of minor issues, the Court reviews about one
percent of the panel decisions.34
Although the Solicitor General's office performs a winnowing
function for the Court by selecting the cases that the government
appeals, that office cannot attempt a global ordering of statutory
issues meriting the Court's attention, because its time and knowl-
edge are limited and it cannot control private petitions. 5 Not sur-
prisingly, the Court devotes varying amounts of attention to
particular statutes, and its choices are not always comprehensible. 36
Moreover, in major regulatory controversies, the size of administra-
31. Our casebook, G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS (3d ed. 1986), introduces students to issues of both regulatory policy and
administrative procedure. Canvassing it reveals Supreme Court contributions on virtu-
ally every important issue of process, with, of course, much working out of detail left to
the lower courts.
32. Canvassing our casebook, id., for substantive ii..ues reveals that many issues of
substantive policy are addressed mainly through court of appeals opinions.
33. Each November, the Harvard Law Review's summary of the last Term of the
Supreme Court includes a statistical profile of the cases in table III. The November
issues of Volumes 100-4 (1986-1990) show the following totals of cases under "Re-
view of Administrative Actions" and "Other Actions by or Against the U.S. or its Of-
ficers" (excluding tax cases, which average about 5 a year, and pure constitutional
challenges that do not appear to involve a statute): 1990, 22 of 137; 1989, 17 of 143;
1988, 28 of 142; 1987, 24 of 152; 1986, 29 of 159.
34. See infra notes 45-50. Including the Federal Circuit, the total for 1990 is
5,789.
35. See generally Meadows, Forward, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1047 (1988).
36. Surely the Court should not devote equal attention to each statute. Unhappily,
there are signs that its priorities in selecting statutes to monitor suffer from the costs of
obtaining enough information to ensure wise choices. See Sturley, supra note 27. For
examples of variations in the intensity of the Court's interest in particular statutes, see
Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 947, 1051-55 (1985); Hellman, The Supreme Court, The National Law, and the
1200 [Vol. 39:1193
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tive records and the length of lower court opinions deter review by a
busy Court. One might rejoin that Congress, not the courts, should
clarify the statutes.37 Yet no matter how well a busy legislature
manages to patch the vast body of its work, a large interstitial role
for lower federal courts will remain.
The decentralization of judicial review of administrative deci-
sions depends on the breadth of possible venue and the propensities
of litigants to select particular courts. Actions against the govern-
ment in district court may be brought where the plaintiff resides,
where the defendant resides (almost always in Washington), or
where the cause of action arose (often in Washington). 38 Similarly,
venue in the courts of appeals is typically broadly defined to include
the petitioner's residence, the place where the cause of action arose,
and the D.C. Circuit.39 Some statutes make the D.C. Circuit the
exclusive review venue.4 If not, it is nearly always a proper one.
These venue rules, like those for general litigation, are meant to
serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and to facilitate ac-
cess to evidence. 41 Yet administrative review has distinctive aspects
that may suggest the need to modify the usual approach. Since re-
view takes place on the agency's record, a local forum is not needed
for witnesses and evidence unless the record must be supplemented.
The government's convenience typically suggests venue in Washing-
ton, where most of its records and lawyers are found.
Private individuals and firms, however, may possess a different
calculus. True, in many administrative cases venue mainly affects
the attorneys, who can usually travel to major cities cheaply
enough. A distant forum does disadvantage litigants in cases of
Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. Prr. L. REV. 521, 609-14, 631-33
(1983).
37. Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417
(1987).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1988). There is also a rarely invoked venue where real
property lies, if any is involved in the action.
39. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98
YALE L.J. 679, 764-70 (1989).
40. E.g., the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9011(a)
(1988); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988); the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)
(1988).
41. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CM. L. REV.
976, 982 (1982); see also Note, Venue for Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A
New Approach, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (1980).
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small money value though.42 In 1962, Congress responded to this
problem by authorizing plaintiffs to sue at home (previously, exclu-
sive district court venue was in Washington). 43
Nevertheless, two considerations have created a tendency for
litigants to select the D.C. Circuit even when others are available.
First, specialized segments of the bar that handle administrative liti-
gation, for example communications lawyers, cluster in Washing-
ton. Second, the Circuit's reputation as a relatively strict overseer
of agencies has attracted challengers. 44
The interplay of venue law and litigant choice has partially
concentrated administrative review in Washington. The D.C. Cir-
cuit hears almost thirty percent of direct appeals to the regional
circuits from administrative agencies; the remainder are somewhat
unevenly divided among the eleven other regional circuits.45
To round out the picture, we must consider two other groups
of administrative law cases. First, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) hears about as many administrative ap-
peals as does the D.C. Circuit, under a mixed group of jurisdictional
grants that often make it the exclusive venue.46 Second, some cases
on appeal from district courts involve administrative law, for exam-
ple attempts to enjoin agency programs. Since these appeals are not
disaggregated in the caseload statistics, however, only a rough esti-
42. Centralized courts have sometimes ridden circuit to alleviate this problem. Ex-
amples are the Tax Court, the Court of Claims, and the Emergency Court of Appeals.
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 169 (1973).
43. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988)). See generally Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 533-45
(1980) (reviewing the legislative history and concluding that § 1391(e) does not apply to
actions for money damages as opposed to injunctions or mandamus).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 105 & 1125.
45. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table B-1. There were 2,578 administrative
appeals in the regional circuits,' 696 of them in the D.C. Circuit (27%). The next largest
number of appeals was 451 in the Ninth Circuit, where the total caseload was 6,787
filings. The ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR, table B-I [hereinafter 1989 AO REPORT] showed 2,965 appeals
from agencies to the regional courts of appeals, with 868 (29%) filed in the D.C. Cir-
cuit. The D.C. Circuit's administrative appeals dropped 19% from 1988, when they
represented 1,066 of the nation's 3,043 administrative appeals, or 35%. ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, table
B- 1.
46. In 1990, 1,466 appeals were filed in the CAFC, with the largest single group
(687) comprising personnel matters from the Merit Systems Protection Board, many of
which are decided summarily. 1990 AO REPORT, supia note 23, table G-2. For a
description of the CAFC's activities, see Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: More than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REV. 43 (1984).
[Vol. 39:11931202
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mate can be made of the administrative law component.47 Statistics
on district court caseloads provide some guidance. About forty per-
cent of the civil cases in which the United States is a party appear to
involve administrative law; they are rather evenly distributed
around the nation.48 If appeal rates are roughly the same for these
cases as the others, the nation's appellate caseload from direct ap-
peals must be increased by two-thirds to reflect all administrative
review. 49 For the D.C. Circuit, adding this component of the
caseload produces a total of about twenty percent of the nation's
administrative law responsibility. 50
The D.C. Circuit's role as a semi-specialized administrative
court has evolved since 1970,51 when Congress unleashed a flood of
new regulatory statutes promoting public health and safety. The
statutes posed more complex and technical issues for both regula-
tors and reviewing courts than had more traditional economic regu-
47. Appeals under "Other U.S. Civil," which exclude prisoner petitions and bank-
ruptcy matters, were 4,363 in 1990, with 415 (about 9%) in the D.C. Circuit. 1990 AO
REPORT, supra note 23, table B-1. There were 4,284 nationally in 1989, with 335 (about
8%) in the D.C. Circuit. 1989 AO REPORT, supra note 45, table B-1.
48. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table C-2, showed 56,300 civil cases pending
in the nation's district courts in which the U.S. was a party. As administrative law
cases, I count: banking (293), civil rights (2,483), commerce (120), economic stabiliza-
tion (10), deportation (49), intellectual property (30), securities (187), contract actions
other than recovery of overpayments (2,705), statutory penalties (2,815), labor (1,155),
social security (7,439), tax (2,600), environmental matters (513), freedom of information
(343), and "all other statutory" cases (2,516), a total of 23,258, or 41%. I exclude
overpayments cases (e.g., student loans), tort claims, real 'property, antitrust, bank-
ruptcy, and prisoner petitions.
49. There were 4,363 "Other U.S. Civil" appeals for 1990, 40% of which is 1,745,
or 67% of the 2,578 direct appeals nationwide. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table
B-1.
50. Adding 40% of the Circuit's "Other U.S. Civil" appeals (166 of 415) to its 696
direct agency appeals totals 862, or 20% of the 4,323 administrative law cases nation-
wide. Id. Although administrative cases loom large in the D.C; Circuit, they account
for only about 10% of the total caseload 'of the courts of appeals. Nationwide, there
were 40,898 cases filed in 1990; 2,578 were administrative appeals. Adding 40% of the
other U.S. civil cases (or 1,745 of 4,363) to the direct appeals would total about 10.5%
of the docket. Id. Shunting some or all of them to other fora would reduce existing
workload pressures but would not alone provide a long-term structural solution to the
docket crisis. Hence, although current caseload pressures may provide the occasion for
restructuring administrative review as part of a larger reorganization of the federal
courts, the particular measures chosen for the administrative cases need not be primar-
ily caseload-driven.
51. Traditionally, the Circuit exercised substantial local jurisdiction under Con-
gress' power to legislate for the'District of Columbia. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In
1970, Congress eliminated that jurisdiction. District of Columbia Court Reform &
Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 570 (1970); see Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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lation of entry and prices in certain industries.5 2 Under the new
statutes, the D.C. Circuit is always an eligible review venue and
often an exclusive one.53 Today, about fifty percent of the Circuit's
docket involves administrative law. 54
Regulatory proceedings can readily produce administrative
records of 10,000 pages or more, filled with conflicting material on
technical issues of fact and policy. A judge must struggle just to
understand the technical issues--evaluating the soundness of their
resolution by the agency and deciding how far to probe are harder
still.55 Accordingly, D.C. Circuit judges decide fewer cases than do
others: about 115 per year per judge, compared to a national aver-
age of 225.56
Large administrative records not only take more time to
master, but also engender longer judicial opinions. 57 By 1985, the
D.C. Circuit's opinions were more than sixty percent longer than
the average for the courts of appeals, with rulemaking and ratemak-
ing cases accounting for most of the difference. 58 As these figures
imply, the most complex and controversial administrative law cases
cluster in the Circuit.59 To offset these burdens, the judges have
learned to skim quickly through briefs, appendices, and records for
the important material.6
52. C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 9-12 (1977); Lilley &
Miller, The New "Social Regulation", 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1977).
53. See G. BERMANT, P. LOMBARD & C. SERON, THE CASES OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT app. A (1982)
(table showing the Circuit's exclusive and shared jurisdiction).
54. In 1990, administrative appeals were 696 of 1,705 filings, or 41%; including
40% of the "Other U.S. Civil" cases coming from district court would add another 166,
for a total of 50.5%. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table B-1.
55. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemak-
ing Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
56. Wald, Verkuil, Rabkin, Cutler, Bonfield & Susman, The Contribution of the
D. C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 512-13 (1988) [hereinafter
Panel] (remarks of Judge Wald).
57. R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 118.
58. Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1003, 1070.
59. G. BERMANT, P. LOMBARD & C. SERON, supra note 53, at 3-4, 43 (45% of all
"high burden" agency cases are filed in the D.C. Circuit).
60. Panel, supra note 56, at 514 (also noting that because the Circuit's relationship
to government counsel is relatively close due to repeat appearances, the resulting dia-
logue may feature more candor and cogency than one between strangers).
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3. The Effects of Judicial Decentralization on' Litigant Behavior
Notwithstanding the partial concentration of administrative
litigation in Washington, D.C., most of the cases are scattered
throughout the nation. In a decentralized system, uncertainty and
slack affect both private and public litigants. Those challenging
agency action possess both opportunities and incentives to engage in
forum shopping. Private litigants amply displayed their perception
of the value of a hospitable forum in the recently restricted "race to
the courthouse."6 A statute provided that when multiple petitions
for review of agency action were filed, the first eligible circuit court
to receive a petition gained jurisdiction. 62 Litigants anxious to vest
review in particular circuits engaged in undignified (but ingenious)
scrambles to be the first to file. These scraambles better suited the
Oklahoma land rush than appellate litigation. 63 Congress finally set
up a lottery system to stop the embarrassing races.64 The effects of
the statute, though, are mostly to improve decorum. Because the
underlying incentives to seek a friendly forum are unchanged, liti-
gants still file appeals in desired fora, hoping to win the lottery.65
In ordinary litigation, forum shopping is not an unmitigated
evil. Indeed, the plaintiff's opportunity to select venue is thought a
natural and legitimate advantage, within bounds. To some extent,
the same considerations apply in administrative law. Some plain-
tiffs who sue the government at home are simply pursuing the con-
venience that Congress intended to ensure. Still, as races to the
courthouse show, influencing the outcome is a frequent goal. 66 A
challenger will not choose a forum that has upheld an agency on a
crucial issue, or that seems likely to do so.
For most agencies, private forum shopping creates real disad-
vantages. Successive challengers may seek review in many regional
61. See McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Adminis-
trative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 304-05 (1980); Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-236, 101 Stat. 1731 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (Supp. 1989)) (imple-
menting Administrative Conference Recommendation for Eliminating or Simplifying
the "Race to the Courthouse" in Appeals from Agency Action, 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-5
(1985)).
62. Of course, the courts retained their usual power to transfer the case to promote
convenience, but litigation often ensued over that decision. McGarity, supra note 61, at
332-42.
63. See id. at 319-22 for a vivid example, in which jurisdiction was timed to hun-
dredths of a second.
64. Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-236, 101 Stat. 1731 (1988) (amending 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3) (1988)).
65. See Note, supra note 41, at 1739-40, for more examples of forum shopping.
66. This purpose is evident whenever a litigant files in a forum that is inconvenient.
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circuits until they find one which is hospitable to their claim. Liti-
gants seeking convenience may add to the dispersal of review that
attends strategic behavior. Agencies that limit their own venue
choice find themselves at a strategic disadvantage, especially against
wealthy parties who are able to travel to a forum thought hospita-
ble.67 Consequently, an agency seeking to administer its statutory
programs in a nationally uniform fashion is likely to face skewed or
conflicting interpretations of its duties from the various circuits.
Agencies have increasingly responded by refusing to "acqui-
esce" in court orders issued below the Supreme Court level. Of
course, agencies honor court orders for the litigating parties; nonac-
quiescence is the refusal to accord them any broader effect. This
practice raises fundamental questions about the locus of responsibil-
ity for conforming administrative decisions to statutory requisites.68
Courts can proclaim that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. ''69 Agencies can
respond that a decentralized judicial system is incapable of an-
nouncing a single rule of law until the Supreme Court speaks.
The Court, acceding to its own limitations, indirectly sup-
ported nonacquiescence in United States v. Mendoza.70 It unani-
mously refused to estop the government from relitigating issues it
had lost in lower court cases against other parties.71 The Court
feared "freezing the first final decision,"'72 by which one district
judge or (more likely) one panel of circuit judges could bind the
nation. Instead, the Court favored the percolation that occurs
67. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 764-70.
68. Nonacquiescence has spawned a large body of recent literature. See Diller &
Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Reply
to Estreicher & Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Eichel, "Respectful Disagreement":
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Court of Appeals
Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 463 (1985); Estreicher & Revesz, The Un-
easy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990); Es-
treicher & Revesz, supra note 39; Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies,
Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986); Schwartz,
Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J.
1815 (1989).
69. E.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir.), vacated and re-
manded, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
70. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
71. Mendoza's support for nonacquiescence is indirect because an agency could
conform its policy to an adverse ruling while seeking relitigation, although a suitable
case would become harder to generate. In a companion case, United States v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), the Court did estop the government from relitigating
an issue it had lost in another circuit against the same party.
72. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
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through litigation in multiple forums.73 As the courts of appeals
produce conflict or consensus on an issue, the Court discovers
where to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction. Thus, judicial decen-
tralization offsets its costs to uniformity with the contributions that
diversity and competition make to development of the law. 74
Mendoza implies the legitimacy of intercircuit nonacquies-
cence, under which a loss in one circuit does not cause an agency to
change its internal policy while it attempts to relitigate the issue
elsewhere. If an agency were forced to conform its policy nation-
wide to the first adverse court ruling, it would lose the benefit of any
subsequent victories, would be compelled to implement a policy
which it disfavored (and which it would jettison at the first opportu-
nity), and would experience difficulty relitigating the issue.75 The
alternative of requiring an agency to press for Supreme Court re-
view of the first adverse decision would be little better. The case
might be a poor vehicle for review. In any event, neither the Solici-
tor General nor the Supreme Court would likely favor the loss of an
opportunity to resolve the issue by further lower court litigation.7 6
Far more controversial is intracircuit nonacquiescence, by
which an agency refuses to alter its policy within a circuit that has
declared it illegal.77 At times this practice is a product of broad
venue-at the time of administrative decision, it is unclear where
review will occur. Yet some agencies persist in nonacquiescence
when venue will certainly be in a court that has already disapproved
their policies. Not surprisingly, considerable judicial hostility often
results.78 Agencies respond that they are avoiding the inequality
that results from administering the law differently in various cir-
cuits. 79 Also, there could be substantial inefficiencies from regional-
izing policy. On the other hand, intracircuit nonacquiescence
creates another inequality, between those who are wealthy enough
73. Nevertheless, for litigation, as for coffee, percolation can go on too long. See
supra note 29.
74. R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 163.
75. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 735-41.
76. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1109.
77. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 743-53 (discussing intracircuit
nonacquiesence by agencies).
78. E.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.) (preliminary injunction aff'd), vacated and remanded,
469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
79. E.g., Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1984); Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy
Regarding Acquiescence and Nonacquiescence in Tax Court Cases, 14 TAX COUNS. Q.
129, 139 (1970).
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to appeal agency orders (and receive nearly automatic reversals)
and those who are not. Because wealth-based inequalities seem less
justifiable than territorial ones, intracircuit nonacquiescence may be
tolerable only as an interim measure while an agency seeks Supreme
Court resolution of the issue.80
The controversy that surrounds intracircuit nonacquiescence
should not obscure its unusual nature. Few agencies openly prac-
tice it."1 For administrative law as a whole, intercircuit nonacquies-
cence is much more significant, because it occurs frequently enough
to fragment the law. The practice is a corollary of the absence of
intercircuit stare decisis.82 If the circuit courts will not treat each
other's decisions as binding, why should an agency? 3 Mendoza's
endorsement of percolation shows why stare decisis does not cross
circuit lines. Indeed, stare decisis is shaky even within a circuit-
panels are known to treat one another's decisions uncharitably.
84
To some extent, inconsistencies within (and among) appellate
courts are irremediable, because there are inherent limits to the ca-
pacity of any collective decisionmakers to achieve consistency.
8 5
Until an en banc decision intervenes, then, agencies know that even
intracircuit nonacquiescence is not wholly futile, especially if a case
appears that presents a good vehicle for review.
What resolves nonacquiescence situations, if the Supreme
Court cannot always do so? Most agencies take an ad hoc approach
to relitigation and give up after a series of reverses.8 6 Yet because
persistence in the face of defeat in the courts of appeals sometimes
80. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 743-53.
81. See id. at 694, 713, 717-18 (identifying the agencies that practice intracircuit
nonacquiesence as the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority, the Federal Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board,
and the Internal Revenue Service). The SSA has since changed its policy. It issues an
"Acquiescence Ruling" following a circuit court decision at variance with its policy,
announcing how the SSA will implement the decision in the circuit and reserving its
right to appeal or relitigate. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985, 410.670C, 416.485 (1991).
82. See generally Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 406, 413 (1972) (discussing lack of intercircuit stare decisis).
83. For positions favoring intercircuit stare decisis, see Keasler v. United States,
766 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1985); Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1049 (2d Cir.
1974); Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal for National Stare Decisis
in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219 (1978).
84. See, e.g., Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 950 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1012 (1989); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474-77 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
85. Cf. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982)
(showing that inconsistency is inevitable in the Supreme Court's decisions).
86. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 713-18; see also Carrington, United
States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study, 11 Hous. L. REV. 1101,
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leads to victory in the Supreme Court,8 7 agencies have an incentive
to undergo considerable abuse from reviewing courts as the price of
keeping an issue alive. In the interim, policy remains uncertain and
citizens receive unequal (not to say mystifying) treatment at the
hands of the two branches.
Thus, the decentralization of judicial review vitiates the uni-
formity of administrative law. Agency nonacquiescence and private
forum shopping exacerbate the problem. The resulting uncertainty
about the law can only breed more litigation.
II. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
Because each agency is centrally organized, it has an overall
grasp of its programs and priorities that is unavailable to a court
reviewing one of its decisions. Consequently, judicial review con-
stantly risks impairing agency operations. To some extent, this
problem inheres in the nature of American law. Litigation consid-
ers only fragments of larger social problems. Moreover, in the fed-
eral courts longstanding constitutional doctrines that define the
parameters of justiciable cases have pressed courts to consider only
those issues directly presented in the controversy at hand.
The creation of specialized courts can alleviate perspective
problems caused by limited information. Even if each case presents
only a small part of an agency's responsibilities, time will bring the
full spectrum of issues before the court. Yet specialization in-
troduces perspective problems of its own, as we shall see.
Although the regional courts of appeals are all theoretically
generalists, variations in their administrative law caseload produce
differing degrees of actual specialization. Decentralized venue
means that reviewing courts will retain a generalist perspective, be-
cause administrative cases comprise only a small portion of a di-
verse docket. Centralized venue creates de facto specialization by
enriching the diet of administrative cases. Hence the geographical
distribution of cases affects the relationship of reviewing courts with
particular agencies, as a brief overview of some typical agency pro-
grams will show.
1104 (1974) (reporting a Justice Department policy forbidding relitigation after three
unanimous defeats in the courts of appeals).
87. E.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
19921 1209
UCLA LAW REVIEW
A. Degrees of Court Centralization and the Nature of Judicial
Review
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) disability benefits
program exemplifies the federal government's massive social welfare
"entitlements" programs. An agency that must struggle to control
its own elaborate bureaucracy confronts highly decentralized judi-
cial review. Not surprisingly, the courts are unable'to meld their
many voices into a coherent set of commands that can realistically
hope to compete with the SSA for control of program administra-
tion.a8 Here, judicial review is at its least powerful and least
helpful.
Each year, SSA considers well over a million new claims for
benefits and holds over 200,000 hearings before administrative law
judges (ALJs) to determine whether claimants are too disabled to
work.89 After the SSA's Appeals Council makes the agency's final
decisions, judicial review begins in the district courts, and now
totals about 7500 cases per year.90 These cases are spread around
the nation.9' As the statistics reveal, judicial review touches only a
tiny fraction of SSA orders. Frequently the issue is the case-specific
one of whether substantial evidence supports the agency decision;
no programmatic question arises. Nor is there any way for a court
to inform the particular bureau within SSA whose decision it over-
turns that an error has been made or to provide incentives to change
the bureau's behavior.92 What does affect decisions in the lower
reaches of the bureaucracy is the agency's own monitoring activ-
ity-internal quality review of decisions,93 regulations of general
applicability, budget and staffing levels, and the like.
88. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISA-
BILITY CLAIMS 185-90 (1983); see also J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W.
SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS
(1978).
89. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., EXECUTIVE HANDBOOK OF SELECTED DATA 25, 30
(1986).
90. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table C-2 (7,048, including SSI). For a report
of the large recent fluctuations in these cases, see Galanter, The Life and Times of the
Big Six: Or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 921,
929-31.
91. 1990 AO REPORT, supra note 23, table C-3.
92. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and
Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
199, 261 (1990).
93. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litiga-
tion Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 791-804 (1974).
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Faced with constant, nationwide judicial review and a massive
federal and state bureaucracy to supervise, SSA formerly chose to
administer its statute uniformly. Thus, SSA's nonacquiescence ex-
tended to intracircuit cases, 94 producing regular clashes with courts
that had invalidated some aspect of its program. 95 After a storm of
controversy in the early 1980s, SSA abandoned its nonacquiescence
policy.96
Judicial review is hampered by the court's exposure to slices of
very complex and subtle issues about agency management. For ex-
ample, the need to process many thousands of disability cases re-
quires the agency to make delicate tradeoffs between the accuracy of
any particular decision and the efficiency with which it can handle
them all.97 Any lawsuit that attempted to monitor the program as a
whole would likely run afoul of doctrines of standing or
reviewability. 98
In decentralized review of high-volume programs, the federal
courts are at a great disadvantage. They cannot be sure that their
review of individual orders promotes consistent outcomes because
they do not see the cases in bulk as the agency does. Nor can they
review agency policy surehandedly. The courts can, however, per-
form two seemingly modest tasks that are nonetheless critical to the
legitimacy of the program. They can assure that the substance of
the agency's policy is rational and consistent with the statute.99
And they can review the agency's procedures for compliance with
due process. 100
94. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 692-704.
95. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1112-13.
96. See supra note 81.
97. The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of this problem. See Heck-
ler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983).
98. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
99. See generally Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV.
505, 557 (1985) (discussing the hard look doctrine); Sunstein, Deregulation and the
Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 203-05 (arguing that deregulation, like
regulation, is subject to judicial review).
100. The leading case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), arose in the disa-
bility program. This case requires a court to balance three factors. First, it must con-
sider the strength of private interest that will be affected by the official action. Second,
it must weigh the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards. Finally, it must examine the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail. Id. at 340-49. See generally J. MASHAW, DUE PRO-
CESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 107-08 (1985) (discussing the Mathews factors
and their application).
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By contrast, the Federal Communications Commission pro-
vides an example of an agency whose policies have been deeply in-
fluenced by relatively centralized judicial review.' 0l Since 1934, the
FCC, acting largely through adjudication, has fleshed out a bare
statutory command to issue broadcast licenses in the "public inter-
est, convenience and necessity."' 02 The courts have felt themselves
on firm ground in reviewing agency action, partly because of the
relatively limited number of licensing proceedings and the nontech-
nical nature of many issues in broadcast regulation (such as the fair-
ness doctrine).
Also aiding close judicial control is the almost total concentra-
tion of FCC litigation in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit.' 0 3 Review of certain important FCC orders, such as license
denials, is vested exclusively in that court by statute. 1°4 Practical
considerations that also bring cases to the D.C. Circuit include the
concentration of the communications bar in Washington and the
court's reputation for comparative strictness with the agency. 10 5
The district courts, hearing few cases, have played a comparatively
minor role, with a consequent increase in the centralization of
review. 106
The relationship of the courts with the FCC has sometimes
been described as a "partnership," a term that would not spring to
mind for their relationship with the SSA.10 7 By turns, the courts
101. A great deal of both communications law and administrative law has resulted.
See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 167-90 (1987) (discussing the courts' relationship with the FCC).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 307(e)(1) (1988).
103. In 1989, 82 of the nation's 85 appeals of FCC decisions were filed in the D.C.
Circuit. 1989 AO REPORT, supra note 45, table S-1.
104. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1988). Review of many other orders is placed in the courts
of appeals generally. Id. § 402(a). An exception exists for orders imposing monetary
penalties, which are reviewable in the district courts. Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
105. See Robinson, The Judicial Role, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW:
POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980s, 415, 416 (G. Robinson ed. 1978).
106. For an exception, see Writers Guild, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064
(C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
107. The term originated in Judge Leventhal's opinion in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The term is
criticized as blurring the distinctiveness of the judicial role in Robinson, supra note 105,
at 419-20; see also Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership
Books, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1975).
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have endorsed broad FCC discretion, 08 prodded it to exercise that
discretion in the public interest,' °9 and curtailed perceived
abuses. 1 0 Responding to the perceived intrusiveness of review, the
FCC has sometimes resisted unpalatable court orders."'I The FCC
and the D.C. Circuit have engaged in prolonged squabbles over for-
mat regulation and the criteria for license renewal." 2 The pattern
of FCC nonacquiescence in the orders of its primary reviewer shows
that interbranch tensions can offset centralization in the judici-
ary,11 3 even though the FCC is much more amenable to judicial
oversight than is the SSA.
The effects of a partly centralized and partly decentralized sys-
tem of judicial review are shown by the Environmental Protection
Agency's early administration of the Clean Air Act. " 4 The division
of review responsibilities between the district and appellate courts
undermined the formation of coherent policy under the Act."
5
EPA's regulations are reviewed in the courts of appeals, usually the
D.C. Circuit." 6 In a series of decisions favorable to environmental-
ists, the relatively centralized appellate courts successfully pressed
EPA to adopt strict national standards. Enforcement of these stan-
dards, however, occurred in civil actions brought by EPA in the
decentralized district courts. Here factors of cost and feasibility
that the appellate courts would not countenance led to decisions
favoring affected industries by easing strict compliance with the
standards." 7 The overall effect was to foster regulatory standards
108. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
109. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
110. E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
111. See, e.g., ITT1 World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir.
1980).
112. The stories are told in G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note
31, at 325-49, 396-412.
113. The FCC has denied that it has a policy of nonacquiescence. Estreicher &
Revesz, supra note 39, at 717.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
115. Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions in this paragraph are drawn from R.
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT ch. 10
(1983).
116. In 1989, 99 of 141 appeals of EPA decisions were filed in the D.C. Circuit; the
next largest number of filings in a particular circuit was 9. 1989 AO REPORT, supra
note 45, table S-1.
117. The Supreme Court supported this dual approach in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246 (1976).
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whose promises far outstripped their performance." 8 Although
well aware of the difficulty of understanding technical issues, courts
were poorly situated to understand administrative issues about this
complicated program because each level of the lower courts saw
only a portion of the issues relevant to administering the
program. 19
These three agency programs have suffered in different ways
from the structure of judicial review. The SSA, facing extremely
decentralized review, has tried to impose its own statutory order at
the cost of threatening the rule of law, yet without an obviously
better alternative in sight. The courts, seeing glimpses of a giant
bureaucracy, have been unable to improve the SSA's overall opera-
tion significantly.
In sharp contrast, the FCC, facing quite centralized judicial
review, has acquired an unwanted "partner" in the D.C. Circuit.
The relationship has revealed the potential for a court to become
too familiar with an agency and its policies. A court that reviews
most of an agency's actions can easily see itself as an overall moni-
tor of agency action, aping (and usurping) that role of Congress and
the executive.' 20 It is difficult, however, to know whether the Cir-
cuit's review has been too stringent. The FCC has had a reputation
for excessive responsiveness to the broadcast industry and to con-
gressional committees. ' 2 ' Perhaps the Circuit, trying to break those
ties, has improved FCC performance. Nevertheless, the FCC has
been willing-and sometimes able-to resist even a centralized re-
viewer that was not final.
For the EPA, the division of authority between trial and appel-
late courts has been mirrored by differences in judicial perspectives.
Poor lines of communication between courts reviewing different
stages of agency action have created artificial gaps in program ad-
ministration. Also, even partial concentration of appellate review
118. R. MELNICK, supra note 115, at 345 ("The narrow focus of the adjudicatory
process has allowed courts hearing enforcement cases to ignore their effect on air qual-
ity and courts hearing cases on general policy to ignore questions of cost and feasibility.
Decentralization has prevented the courts from taking a more unified view of the regu-
latory process and the public interest.").
119. Id. at 388, 393; see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 31,
at 624-50 (illustrative case study involving regulation of powerplant emissions). The
case is extensively analyzed in B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR (1981).
120. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court, invoking separation of
powers principles, emphatically rejected such a role for the federal courts.
121. L. POWE, supra note 101, ch. 10.
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has not prevented inconsistent judicial directives to the EPA that
have burdened its operation.' 2
2
B. Doctrinal Effects of the Structure of Judicial Review
The structure of judicial review has produced a struggle over
administrative law doctrine between the semi-specialized Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the generalized Supreme Court.
The relationship between the Circuit and the Court has been un-
easy, and often unpleasant, for years.1 23 The Court has taken-and
reversed-substantially more cases from the D.C. Circuit than from
others.1 24 Repeatedly, the Court has disapproved what it perceived
as overly stringent review by the Circuit.1 25 In this relationship be-
tween an angry principal and an unruly agent, both parties deserve
blame-and praise.
A simple explanation for the persistent clashes between these
courts is ideological-that a group of liberal judges on the court of
appeals lost touch with a more conservative Court.126 This differ-
ence between the courts has eroded with turnover on the Circuit.
Ideology does appear to account for some of the disparity in out-
look between the two courts in the cases discussed below. Unfortu-
nately, it cannot be isolated from influences stemming from the
differing responsibilities of the two courts. Although specialization
may encourage activist review, its impact may be swamped by the
predilections a judge brings to the bench. Hence it is not possible to
assign a single cause for the clash.
122. See infra text accompanying note 137.
123. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. Cr. REV. 345.
124. Panel, supra note 56, at 507; Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship
Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National
Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048 (1984).
125. The landmark cases discussed in the text below, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (infra text accompanying
notes 135-148), Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (infra text accompanying notes 151-160), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (infra
text accompanying notes 149-150) all rebuked the Circuit for infringing agency discre-
tion. See also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983). On the other hand, the Court has also reversed the Circuit for
restricting standing to challenge agency action. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
U.S. 388 (1987); UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
126. See Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 300, 304; Note, supra note 124, at 1048. But see Edwards, Public Misperceptions
Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D. C. Circuit, 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1985).
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As Justice Scalia has put it, "[a]s a practical matter, the D.C.
Circuit is something of a resident manager, and the Supreme Court
an absentee landlord" in administrative law. 127 Although the D.C.
Circuit is drawn from a more national pool of nominees than are
the other regional circuits,1 28 it works "inside the beltway" in a city
suffused with information about federal government operations.
Life in the capital, together with a docket heavy in administrative
law, encourages the judges to believe they are best situated among
reviewing courts to perceive emerging administrative law issues, de-
tect questionable patterns of agency behavior, and produce in-
formed opinions.129
The Supreme Court, also residing in the capital, may regard
itself as the Circuit's equal in understanding government. The
Court may perceive that its more comprehensive docket produces a
sounder perspective on the place of regulation in the nation's life.
Thus, Court generalists display impatience with what appears to be
tunnel vision and meddling by Circuit specialists. For their part,
the specialists may find the generalists too busy to develop an un-
derstanding of the "real" problems.
The Supreme Court also has an institutional responsibility for
the operation of the federal courts that tends to produce conflict
with the Circuit. As with ideology, it is difficult to isolate the effects
of this difference between the courts from the effects of specializa-
tion. The Court often crafts doctrine that a decentralized judiciary
can apply with minimum disruption to the agencies, whether or not
that doctrine is the best way for a particular court to review an
agency decision. 130
The Circuit struggled throughout the 1970s and '80s to dis-
charge its administrative review functions capably. In doing so, it
displayed the experimental style of a specialist looking for the best
way to perform repetitive functions, a style easy to reconcile with
the common law tradition of our judicially generated administrative
law doctrines. For the Circuit, the vexing issues have concerned
review of rulemaking and informal adjudication. The APA pro-
vides only rudimentary procedures for rulemaking and none at all
127. Scalia, supra note 123, at 371.
128. Other circuits gain some local flavor from the requirement that district judges
reside in their district, and from the practice of executive consultation of a state's sena-
tors in choosing both district and circuit judges.
129. See Panel, supra note 56, at 512 (remarks of Chief Judge Wald, claiming these
attributes for the Circuit, but not claiming comparative advantage over the Supreme
Court).
130. This thesis is persuasively advanced by Strauss, supra note 19.
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for informal adjudication; for neither function does it define a rec-
ord for judicial review. The Supreme Court's directive in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 131 to review these actions on
the administrative record under the APA's generic "arbitrariness"
scope of review132 led to extended lower court experimentation, es-
pecially in the D.C. Circuit.
The Circuit found itself in a position of leadership both in de-
fining the scope of review and in applying it to new and dauntingly
complex agency functions. Both tasks were formidable. Overton
Park, like a bad general, issued cryptic marching orders. 33 Show-
ing a poor grasp of the problems before it, the Supreme Court did
not clearly define either the administrative record that courts were
to review or the meaning of arbitrariness review. So the Circuit has
done its best, producing some opinions that very thoughtfully ex-
plore the issues.' 34 Episodically, the Supreme Court has intervened
with correctives, often in unfairly harsh terms.
In three landmark cases the Court has reversed the Circuit for
engaging in unduly intrusive review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,135 the Court instructed re-
viewing courts to defer strongly to an agency's interpretation of its
statute. The case involved the EPA's "bubble" approach to air pol-
lution control, which allows the aggregation of emissions from sepa-
rate facilities within the same factory, so that increases from one
facility can be offset by decreases from another.' 36 Two courts of
appeals, demonstrating the disadvantages of decentralization, had
disagreed on the legality of the bubble, forbidding the approach in
one part of Clean Air Act administration but requiring it in an-
other. The resulting difficulties for EPA may have spurred the
Supreme Court to diminish lower court authority to interpret stat-
131. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
132. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
133. See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and
Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975); Pedersen, supra note 12, at 62-64.
134. E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976).
135. 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). See generally Pierce, Chevron and
Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41
VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) (suggesting a "strong" reading of Chevron).
136. See generally Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines
to Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285 (1985) (supporting EPA's approach).
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utes. The Court called for a two-part inquiry. 137 First, courts are
to determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue" 13s in the text or legislative history of the statute.
If so, of course Congress's will must govern. If not, the second in-
quiry is whether the agency interpretation is "reasonable."'13 9 If so,
the court must defer to it.
The Chevron test reduces the potential for inconsistent inter-
pretations of statutes by the lower courts precisely where they are
most likely to occur---on doubtful issues of law. t4° Instead, the
agency's nationally uniform policy will prevail. Chevron itself in-
volved a technical issue imbedded in a complex statutory scheme.
Here, as the courts of appeals had inadvertently demonstrated, law
and policy tend to intertwine in ways that cause decentralized judi-
cial review to risk undue interference with administration. It is easy
for any one reviewing court to focus on the issues at hand and ig-
nore the effect on the agency of independent statutory interpreta-
tions by the other circuits.
Nevertheless, Chevron's approach is oversimplified. Adminis-
trators rarely fly in the face of clear statutory text or legislative his-
tory. In the interstices, where most litigated policies lie, the courts
(including the Supreme Court) have routinely decided difficult is-
sues of statutory interpretation that depend on the overall structure
and purposes of the statute. On these issues, the courts have some-
times deferred to agency interpretation, and sometimes not.14' The
apparent inconsistencies may reflect not only judicial indiscipline
but also variations in the appropriate judicial approach to particular
statutes. 14
2
The D.C. Circuit's specialization has immersed it in a series of
complex and important regulatory controversies, often in the
shadow of strict, "agency-forcing" statutes.143 Certainly, repeat liti-
gation has made the Circuit familiar with statutes as complex as the
Clean Air Act. Perhaps, in a way that specialization invites, the
137. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 285
(1986).
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
139. Id. at 845.
140. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1121-22.
141. See generally G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 31, at
155-57 (discussing variations in deference).
142. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363 (1986).
143. See generally B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 119 (comparing these
statutes with the broad delegations that typified the New Deal era).
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Circuit has drifted into an active role of enforcing the "spirit" of
these statutes, instead of limiting itself to reconciling agency action
with policies found in statutory text, structure, and history. A
generalist court may provide a better buffer between government
and the regulated. 144 Thus, the Supreme Court, well aware of its
own unfamiliarity with complex statutory schemes, has sometimes
urged caution in reviewing their administration.' 45
A much less deferential approach might be appropriate, how-
ever, for nontechnical subject matter or statutes intended to curb
agency abuses. If Chevron means that lower courts must defer
strongly regardless of the context, it may disable needed review.146
Thus, institutional considerations suggest that lower courts may re-
sist Chevron's instructions, especially when the courts are special-
ized enough to acquire familiarity with particular statutes. In the
immediate wake of Chevron, agency affirmance rates did rise sub-
stantially in the courts of appeals.147 But they eventually sank back
toward preceding levels.' 48
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 149 the Supreme Court sharply rebuked the
D.C. Circuit for requiring agencies to adopt rulemaking procedures
not prescribed by statute. The Court, condemning what it per-
ceived as procedural tinkering, emphasized the resulting unpredict-
ability of judicial review and its tendency to force agencies to
increase procedural formality in self-defense. Yet the Court left the
door open for substantive remands that could encourage agencies to
engage in similar defensive formality, this time through elaborate
justification of even minor substantive decisions.150
This apparent anomaly was confirmed in Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. ,151 in which the Court ratified a strict, "hard look" review of
the substantive rationality of agency policy that had developed in
144. R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 155, 159.
145. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1126-29; see, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984).
146. Later cases reveal some concern within the Court over Chevron's simplicities.
See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
147. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 58, at 1029-42.
148. Id.
149. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
150. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
151. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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the D.C. Circuit.1 2 State Farm instructed lower courts to probe
the factual and policy bases of agency decisions to ensure that they
are persuasively supported by the administrative record. Lower
court judges have complained that while Chevron disables them
from the law-interpreting function that they are suited to perform,
State Farm mandates an inquiry into agency policy that will often
exceed their competence.153 The Court's management responsibili-
ties may explain the apparent inconsistency. State Farm allows
stringent review when varying lower court instructions to an agency
have limited effects on overall agency programs. Invalidation of a
particular rule for arbitrariness does not directly affect other aspects
of administration in the way that a statutory interpretation usually
does. Therefore, misapplication of the Court's test is less likely than
conflicting interpretations of the statute to disrupt agency pro-
grams.15 4 Vermont Yankee invites a similar explanation. A lower
court order to an agency to employ a procedure not found in any
statute would send ripples to other statutory programs of a roughly
similar nature that are administered by numerous agencies.
Yet the Vermont Yankee Court's nightmares afflict State Farm
too. First, review is unpredictable, because some reviewing courts
will overstep their role by substituting their judgment for that of the
agency. Second, agencies must pad their records and explanatory
documents to avoid remands for insufficiently considering some is-
sue that becomes important only through advocates' arguments on
appeal. It is possible that "hard look" review has constricted
agency policymaking, even driving some agencies to avoid rulemak-
ing in favor of the supposedly more burdensome procedures of adju-
dication. 55 Agency affirmance rates in the courts of appeals are
substantially higher for adjudication than for rulemaking.1 56
152. Although the Court endorsed a relatively strict form of substantive review that
the D.C. Circuit had led in developing, it disapproved the Circuit's use of an even
stricter test for some deregulatory actions. See Garland, supra note 99; Sunstein, supra
note 99.
153. E.g., Breyer, supra note 142, at 397.
154. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1129-31. Of course, one should not minimize the
possible disruption of an agency's mission that is caused by remand of an especially
important matter, such as the passive restraints regulation in State Farm. Years of
effort can go to waste.
155. Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Pierce, supra note 126. The presence of
rulemaking review by OMB may also have this effect. See generally Bruff, supra note 17
(discussing the OMB review program).
156. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 58, at 1021-22 (60% of adjudications affirmed;
40% of rulemakings affirmed in one recent period). These aggregate figures must be
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Having developed hard look review, the specialized Circuit
might be expected to be insufficiently attentive to its costs. Yet
State Farm provided the generalist Court a poor opportunity to de-
tect such costs, since the agency's record entirely failed to address a
major issue, the suitability of mandatory restraints such as airbags.
The Supreme Court, with its episodic exposure to administrative
law, is vulnerable to perspectives presented by particular cases,
whatever the bulk of them would show. And the Court is poorly
situated to reconcile cases that appear to present distinct issues but
actually have similar potential impacts on agencies, unless litigants
call the Court's attention to the connection.
Doctrinal effects may flow not only from the Court's generalist
nature and limited review capacity, but also from its concern with
overall caseloads in the federal courts. This concern may have con-
tributed to recent decisions restricting standing to seek review,
1 57
expanding implied preclusion of review, 158 and holding that agency
decisions not to take enforcement actions are presumptively unre-
viewable.' 5 9 The D.C. Circuit seems to have caught the spirit, and
has taken a newly strict approach to these threshold issues.
6°
Perhaps we can adjust the structure of judicial review to allow
administrative law doctrine to develop free of the distorting influ-
ences that have affected both the Circuit and the Court as well as
the inconsistencies inherent in decentralization. Part III proposes
remedies for these problems.
III. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
A. Methods for Centralizing Judicial Decisions
As we have seen, conflicting decisions can arise both within
and among the circuits. The actual amount of intracircuit conflict
is debatable. Nevertheless, litigant perception that panels disagree
is enough to foster repeat litigation. 61 Moreover, without direct
approached with caution, however, because many of the remands are partial or minor in
nature.
157. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
158. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
159. Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
160. Panel, supra note 56, at 524-25 (remarks of Chief Judge Wald).
161. See Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions
and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1979) (surveying judges and
attorneys and reporting perceptions of substantial conflicts).
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disagreements, a series of panel decisions can create sufficient legal
disarray to engender litigation-producing uncertainty. 162
The traditional response to intracircuit conflict is en banc pro-
cedure. ' 63 Unfortunately, the disincentives to holding en banc hear-
ings are considerable and increase with the size of the circuit.164
These proceedings are very difficult to convene and to administer.165
Extraordinary amounts of time and effort must be devoted to con-
sidering whether to grant review, assembling the judges, discussing
the decision, and circulating opinions. 166
Consequently, en banc proceedings are rare today-they com-
prise less than one percent of court of appeals decisions.167 Ironi-
cally, the Supreme Court reviews more court of appeals panel
decisions than do all the circuits sitting en banc.168 Surely, more
than one percent of appellate decisions merit more than a panel's
attention. This is especially true in large circuits, since intracircuit
conflicts become more likely as the number of judges increases. 69
The D.C. Circuit's twelve judges can be combined into 220 panels;
the Ninth Circuit's twenty-eight judges, into 3,276.170 Obviously, a
court the size of the Ninth Circuit is extremely cumbersome.' 17 A
uniform "law of the circuit" becomes very difficult to secure.
Accordingly, the courts of appeals have begun to experiment
with simplified procedures for promoting uniformity, such as the
162. See Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Prece-
dent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 595 (1989) (surveying Ninth
Circuit cases and finding much disarray but little actual conflict).
163. En banc review occurs when ordered by a majority of the active judges in a
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). Its purposes are "to secure or maintain uniformity of
... decision" or to consider "a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. APP. P.
35(a).
164. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 161-63,
200-02.
165. For complaints of the Ninth Circuit judges about the difficulty of holding en
banc proceedings, stated when that circuit was about half its present size, see Wasby,
supra note 161, at 1364-66.
166. Id. at 1365-66.
167. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 29, 46 (1988).
168. ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
169. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUC-
TURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 57-59 (1975),
reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 264-66 (1976) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE].
170. ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 25-26 (noting that these figures are under-
stated because they omit the frequent presence of senior or visiting judges).
171. See generally J. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPEL-
LATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985) (discussing
problems that prompted the Ninth Circuit to reform its procedures).
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circulation of draft panel opinions that might create either a conflict
or an important precedent to the rest of the judges for review and
comment. 172  Such informal procedures dampen disagreement
through norms of collegiality, which are reinforced by each judge's
awareness that the cooperation of others will be necessary in the
future. Clearly, though, substantial amounts of slack remain in the
system, allowing panels to depart from preferences that the whole
circuit would display.1 73
When they do occur, en banc hearings do not necessarily serve
their purposes of curing conflict and deciding important questions
clearly-en banc decisions are much more likely than panel deci-
sions to produce fragmented opinions.174 In a recent period, two
thirds of D.C. Circuit en banc decisions contained a dissent; the rate
for the Circuit's panel decisions was about six percent.175 The Cir-
cuit tends to use en banc procedure to decide important issues
rather than to resolve conflicting precedents.1 76 Understandable as
it is, this practice preserves disuniformity in the law and probably
accounts for some disharmony as well, as judges become unwilling
to suppress their differences in important cases. Also, the size of a
court matters-the number of separate agreements necessary to
produce unanimity rises exponentially as the number of deciders
increases. 177
These difficulties have led to statutory authorization for limited
en banc review.' 78 Any circuit having fifteen or more members may
employ any number of judges prescribed by local rule in place of the
usual practice of using all active judges.' 79 The Ninth Circuit has
implemented this authority by providing for en banc hearings of
eleven judges, consisting of the chief judge and ten others drawn by
lot. The Circuit's implementation has led to a doubling of its en
172. Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Prac-
tices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 544-57 (1986); see also Hellman, supra note 162, at
547.
173. See Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 107-15
(1986) (arguing that the decisions of multimember courts may be consistent while lack-
ing logical coherence).
174. Solimine, supra note 167, at 46-47.
175. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 172, at 541.
176. Id. at 537 (surveying cases). The Ninth Circuit appears to follow the same
practice. See Hellman, supra note 162, at 549.,
177. R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 14.
178. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 203-04.
179. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988)).
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bane decisions and a halving of the time from their submission to
decision (from 349 to 175 days). 180
Limited en banc review alleviates problems of appellate court
size, but it does not cure them. Instability inheres in any review by
less than a full court, since the excluded voices may later be heard
in panel decisions that resist the circuit's law or even try to overturn
the first outcome.' 8 These defections from a limited en bane deci-
sion could have a compensating advantage by signaling the
Supreme Court that an issue merits its attention. Since a panel will
usually hide its defections, however, a dissent pointing out the in-
consistency may be needed to attract outside attention. In any
event, stability and efficiency act in opposition as one considers the
optimum proportion of a court to employ: the inefficiency of larger
numbers is offset by the stability of decision gained by approaching
the participation of the full court.
Whatever the success of the courts in minimizing intracircuit
conflict through limited en bane procedures, problems of intercir-
cuit conflict will remain. And it is the effects of our regional scheme
of court organization that most hamper the development of uniform
administrative law. Here too, reform proposals abound. These fo-
cus on ameliorating the overall effects of decentralization on our
national law, not merely the administrative cases.' 8 2
In particular, debate has focussed upon proposals to create a
national court of appeals to relieve the Supreme Court of some of its
burdens by resolving conflicts among the circuits. Advanced in va-
riant forms by the Freund Committee,8 3 the Hruska Commis-
180. J. CECIL, supra note 171, at 43.
181. As of 1985, the Ninth Circuit had yet to invoke its procedure for reconsidera-
tion of a limited en bane decision by the full court. Id. The stability of these decisions
may be aided by the Circuit's requirement that all active judges vote on whether to hold
a limited en bane hearing. Also, judges on a limited panel appear to feel an obligation to
consult the other judges in an effort to assure the acceptability of their product. Id. at
44.
182. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 225 (1985). For a series of imaginative possibilities, outlined
but not advocated, see STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 116-24. See also
ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 10-24.
183. The Committee recommended a seven member court staffed by circuit judges
serving staggered three year terms; the court would be empowered to screen petitions
for Supreme Court review, refer some to the Court, review others itself, and dismiss the
rest. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(Federal Judicial Center 1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1973). For a sampling of
the resulting controversy, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3510, at 46 n.9 (1984); Hufstedler, Bad Recipes for Good
Cooks-Indigestible Reforms of the Judiciary, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 795-800 (1985);
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sion, 184 and Chief Justice Burger, 185 the idea has yet to prevail or
die. 186 The Federal Courts Study Committee, made cautious by the
criticism that met broader proposals, has advanced an experimental
model 187 under which the Supreme Court would refer selected cases
to en banc courts of appeals, chosen on a random basis, for deci-
sions that would be nationally binding (if the Court let them stand).
Criticisms of these proposals have centered on several pre-
dicted problems.' 8 8 Adding another layer of review could delay
federal litigation while offering little improvement in the law's sta-
bility (if rotating panels are used). The prestige of the courts of
appeals could erode due to their perceived demotion, lowering the
quality of prospective circuit judges. The Supreme Court's work-
load could increase by screening cases for the new court and moni-
toring its activity closely.
If a new layer of review is to be avoided, a structural means to
promote uniformity of decision in each of the circuits is subject
matter organization. 8 9 The court could be divided into permanent
panels of manageable size (e.g., five, seven), each with a perma-
Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Moun-
tain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 914 n.9 (1983); Note, Congressional Prerog-
atives, the Constitution and a National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715,
716 n.7 (1978).
184. Responding to criticism that the Freund proposal would divest the Supreme
Court of control over its docket, the Commission recommended a national court of
appeals staffed permanently with seven Article III judges; the court would decide cases
referred to it by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE, supra note 169, 5-39, 67 F.R.D. at 208-47. For commentary, see Haworth &
Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
201, 206-08 (1979); Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judi-
cial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976); Note, supra note 183, at 739-44.
185. Drawing on earlier bills considered in Congress, Burger proposed an Intercir-
cuit Panel to be composed of one judge from each of the thirteen courts of appeals; the
court would hear cases involving conflicts between circuits referred to it by the Supreme
Court. W. BURGER, 1985 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 13; Burger, The
Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 86, 88. The proposal
was favored by Baker & McFarland, supra note 26, at 1416, and opposed by Ginsburg
& Huber, supra note 37, at 1435.
186. For discussions of these and other studies and proposals, see S. ESTREICHER &
J. SEXTON, supra note 27, at 15-31; Baker, supra note 182, at 238-43.
187. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 125-29.
188. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 27, at 111-15, for a summary of
these problems.
189. This paragraph summarizes a scheme advocated in Meador, An Appellate
Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 471 (1983). See also P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note
4, at 167-84; Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional De-
sign of the US. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989) [hereinafter Meador,
Challenge].
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nently assigned jurisdiction that is diverse enough to be interesting.
The judges would rotate among the panels at a rate designed to
balance stability of decision with freshness of viewpoint. This
would preserve judicial generalization because a particular judge
eventually would exercise all of the court's jurisdiction.
Used in Europe, subject matter organization appeared in the
United States in modified form in 1982 with the creation of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). 19° Congress
combined a number of specialized fora in an effort to create a court
with "a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues."' 191
The CAFC, whose jurisdiction includes patents, international trade,
claims against the government, and personnel matters, 192 shows
some early signs of success.' 93
Nearly two decades of crisis and debate have confirmed that
judicial reform is "no sport for the short-winded." With the pros-
pects for overall restructuring of the judiciary still uncertain, I focus
here on the narrower, but still important, needs of administrative
law.
Existing proposals that the courts of appeals be reorganized on
a subject matter basis to relieve docket pressure 94 can be adapted to
further the coordination of administrative law. If exclusive venue
for cases arising under designated statutes were assigned to each of
the regional courts of appeals, it would be possible to articulate uni-
form national law short of the Supreme Court. Existing concentra-
tions in the caseload suggest how this could be done. For example,
securities cases tend to gather in the Second Circuit, 95 immigration
appeals in the Ninth. 96 A circuit having responsibility for inter-
preting a set of statutes could be expected to develop substantial
expertise about them. 197 This remedy also has the virtue of relative
simplicity.
190. Federal Courts Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
191. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981).
192. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 111, 1126 n.65 (1990).
193. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (concluding that CAFC's patent jurisdiction shows signs of
success).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 189-193.
195. Meador, Challenge, supra note 189, at 614.
196. 1989 AO REPORT, supra note 45, table S-1 (154 of 285).
197. See McGarity, supra note 61, at 365-67 (noting this effect could follow use of
the transfer mechanism to concentrate cases).
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Several difficulties would ensue, however. First, allocation of
statutes to particular circuits would be a politically charged event,
as interest groups shopped in advance for a favorable forum. The
stakes would be high because it would be necessary to allocate sub-
stantially all cases arising under a particular statute to a single court
to achieve coordination. 198 For example, where should the Endan-
gered Species Act be assigned-to the Ninth Circuit, currently the
locale of a standoff between environmentalists and loggers, 199 or to
the D.C. Circuit, relatively insulated from local political pressure?
Moreover, once statutory allocations were decided, appoint-
ments to the regional circuits could be skewed by interest group
pressure. To offset this tendency, it would be necessary to ensure a
rich enough mix of jurisdiction for each circuit to generalize its
docket. The administrative law cases could be varied by assigning
unrelated statutes affecting disparate interests, for example by mix-
ing entitlements and regulatory statutes. Some sacrifice in expertise
would result, though. It should be possible to prevent the adminis-
trative cases from dominating any regional court's docket because
they comprise only about ten percent of the total caseload and most
of the regional circuits are about the same size. 2°° Thus, the size of
the courts would not be altered, but the regional circuits would re-
ceive no caseload relief.
Another disadvantage of subject matter organization would be
inconvenience. Most litigants would have to travel, except to the
extent that statutory allocations reflected natural concentrations in
the caseload (for example, securities cases in the Second Circuit).
Hence this method of coordination would impose substantial bur-
dens on litigants, perhaps unnecessarily and unfairly deterring ap-
peals in routine cases of small money value. However, there would
be some compensating gains for the courts, since forcing all appel-
late cases arising under a particular statute into one forum would
ensure judicial familiarity with issues of administration and would
promote judicial efficiency by maximizing expertise. Nevertheless,
coordination is most needed only for the fraction of the cases that
present major issues of statutory interpretation or that result from
forum shopping.
198. Coordination could not be complete without bifurcating litigation, because
some cases raise issues under more than one statute. Instead of bifurcation, existing
lottery procedures for assigning cases filed in more than one circuit could be adapted to
the allocation of complex cases. See supra note 64.
199. See supra note 22.
200. Except for the First Circuit (6 judges) and the Ninth (28), all the regional cir-
cuits have between 10 and 17 judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988).
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B. Specialized Review: An Administrative Court?
Specialized courts present a tantalizing, yet ultimately disap-
pointing, prospect to the judicial reformer. 201 Although they can
redress all of the systemic ills that I have identified so far, they do so
at a price that has led Congress to be sparing in their use. Never-
theless, there has been sufficient experience with these courts so that
their general benefits and costs are well known.20 2
First, specialized courts relieve the caseload burdens of other
courts, perhaps substantially. Shunting all administrative cases
from federal court would alleviate, but not eliminate, the current
caseload crisis, since such cases comprise only ten percent of the
docket. Gauging workload relief is not, however, a matter of sim-
ply counting filings shifted from one court to another. What mat-
ters is the amount of time and effort spared the judges. As the
experience of the D.C. Circuit shows, major administrative law
cases impose exceptional burdens on the courts. Yet devotion of
scarce resources to these cases implies their importance and coun-
sels caution in diverting them.
Second, specialized judges can become expert in the substan-
tive and procedural issues surrounding particular programs, espe-
cially highly technical ones. More accurate decisions should result.
Expertise can take several forms. Some subjects draw on extralegal
training, for example, the use of engineering and science in patents
or environmental law. Much of this sort of expertise relates to is-
sues of fact and policy. Although it would not be efficient for gener-
alized courts to emphasize expensive training in the background of
their judges or staff, the opposite may be true of specialized courts.
Legal expertise, as in tax, may depend on long study of a complex
body of law. Here also, a generalized court may waste knowledge
that a specialized one could seek-or could develop through expo-
sure to its docket.
Third, because of their expertise and a limited caseload, spe-
cialized courts can produce expeditious decisions. As in Adam
Smith's pin factory, division of labor avoids wasteful duplication of
201. The discussion in this section of the general benefits and costs of specialized
courts substantially repeats the analysis in Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative
Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330-32 (1991).
202. The general considerations that I outline in text are explored in R. POSNER,
supra note 25, at 147-60; Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Questfor the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63-71 (1975); Dreyfuss,
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 377-84; Jordan, Specialized Courts:
A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1981); Revesz, supra note 192, at 1116-21.
1228 [Vol. 39:1193
COORDINATING JUDICIAL REVIEW
training for specialized tasks. And the number of judges can be
adjusted to the historical caseload. There is, however, some special
vulnerability to exogenous factors affecting the underlying contro-
versies. For example, a special court for bank fraud would have
been sleepy in the seventies and inundated in the eighties.
Finally, specialized courts reduce or eliminate intercourt con-
flicts, promoting a uniform national body of law. They have tradi-
tionally been established in response to a perceived rise in
conflicting court orders, uncertainty about the law, and forum shop-
ping. The goal of decreasing intercourt conflict carries special im-
portance now that caseloads have effectively decentralized the
federal courts by reducing the likelihood of Supreme Court review
of most court of appeals decisions. A single, specialized court can
articulate a consistent body of law in a way that thirteen courts of
appeals cannot.
A primary cost of specialization is loss of the generalist per-
spective. A premise of our nation's usual resort to courts of general
jurisdiction is that sound decisionmaking results from exposure to a
wide range of problems, rather than from initiation into an arcane
set of mysteries. Generalization has two related benefits. Exposure
to loosely related legal issues may produce new insights. More
often, a wider perspective aids judgment by forestalling the exagger-
ated sense of importance that long immersion may lend to some
social problem. A broadened perspective may be especially impor-
tant for those who review the action of bureaucracies that are them-
selves narrowly focused.
Also, specialization may diminish the prestige of a court. The
fear persists that a specialist court will be staffed by lower caliber
judges, drones who can tolerate life in the pin factory. Part of a
court's success in obtaining compliance with its mandates flows
from the respect others have for it. And depending on the subject
matter that is segregated, there is also a risk of impairing the re-
maining generalist courts by leaving them with less interesting fare.
Specialization can produce bias problems in two ways. First,
the appointments process may be distorted as nominees are selected
and confirmed for their views on specific issues. Pressure on the
appointing authority will come from two sources. Interest groups
affected by the court's decisions will have a strong incentive to ad-
vance their allies. Agencies reviewed by the court will proclaim the
understanding and eminence of their own alumni. Even if initially
disinclined to lobby for favorable appointments, both interest
groups and agencies may be driven to adopt such behavior to offset
122919921
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the activities of the other. The pool of eligible candidates may seem
limited to a quite narrow group of former agency staff and a special-
ized segment of the bar. To the extent that qualifications for the
court converge with those for the principal executive positions in
the agency reviewed, excessive convergence of perspective in agency
and court may also occur. These problems of litmus tests and lim-
ited pools do not usually confront generalist courts.
Second, specialization can distort application of the review
standard. Growing expertise may lead courts to substitute their
judgment for that of an agency, creating an overly dominant over-
sight body. On the other hand, such a court can become too
friendly with an agency that it reviews regularly or with interests
that dominate it. Moreover, it is difficult for those monitoring the
court from outside, for example in Congress, to identify these ef-
fects. Although gross rates of reversal may be suggestive, the frame
of reference is suspect. For example, a high rate of reversal com-
pared to generalist courts with similar responsibilities (if there are
any) may mean that review is too stringent or only that the agency
is unusually inept.
1. Administrative Court Proposals
From the New Deal through the early 1960s, administrative
lawyers advanced recurrent proposals for specialized courts to exer-
cise original rather than review jurisdiction. The purpose was to
strip agencies of their adjudicative responsibilities and to vest them
in one or more administrative courts. Proponents have included el-
ements of the American Bar Association, 20 3 members of the early
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 4 the
presidential Hoover Commission, 205 and certain prominent mem-
bers of independent regulatory agencies.20 6 Unconvinced of the
203. See Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966, 971
(1936).
204. AT-FORNEY GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 203-12
(1941).
205. COMMISSION ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 84-88 (1955); see also TASK
FORCE ON LEGAL SERV. & PROCEDURE, COMMISSION ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 1-50 (1955).
For a critique, see Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1283-89
(1955).
206. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Pro-
cess, 15 ADMIN. L. REV. 146 (1963). For critiques, see Auerbach, Some Thoughts on
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fairness of agency adjudication, these critics charged that agencies
insufficiently insulated adjudicators from contacts with
prosecutorial and policy-making personnel.207 As a maturing ad-
ministrative law has improved separation of functions protec-
tions,208 the rationale for these proposals has weakened.
20 9
Moreover, it is increasingly clear that many agencies need both
rulemaking and adjudication at their disposal to make effective
policy.
The 1971 Ash Council Report contained an odd variant of the
earlier proposals: it proposed a single administrative court to review
decisions of independent agencies in transportation, power, and se-
curities matters. 210 Although the court was to be formally limited
to review of agency adjudication, very short deadlines for adminis-
trative action made it likely to displace original agency discretion in
practice. With so narrow a jurisdiction yet so invasive a charter,
this proposal met fatal opposition.
211
An approach that is broader than that of the Ash Council, yet
still selective, can be envisioned. A new administrative court could
take on most or all existing review responsibilities of the' federal
courts.212 Such a court could take a variety of forms.213 It could
include agencies administering major health and safety regulation
and some aspects of traditional economic regulation, but not high
the Hector Memorandum, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 183; Cary, Why I Oppose the Divorce of
the Judicial Function from the Federal Regulatory Agencies, 51 A.B.A. J. 33 (1965).
207. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 42, at 179-80.
208. See generally Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the
Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759 (1981) (surveying current
agency separation of functions).
209. Since separation of functions remains incomplete, however, these proposals
persist; e.g., Marquardt & Wheat, The Developing Concept of an Administrative Court,
33 ADMIN. L. REV. 301 (1981).
210. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORG., NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971).
211. See the influential Views of the Administrative Conference on the "Report on
Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies" of the President's Advisory Council on Exec-
utive Organization, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
27 (1973). See also Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996
(1971), for especially withering criticism. Actually the court appeared to be a half-
baked afterthought to a broader government reorganization proposal that had defects of
its own. The reorganization is trenchantly criticized in Robinson,. On Reorganizing the
Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947 (1971).
212. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 42, at 183-89, for an outline ofsuch a court and
a suggestion that it be considered in the future.
213. For example, specialist or generalist judges could be selected; they could join
the court by designation or on rotation; panels could be allocated particular subject
matter; they could ride circuit. Currie & Goodman, supra note 202, at 75-76.
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volume adjudicatory programs in which the need for separate re-
view or a local forum is strong, such as social security.214
There is reason, however, to oppose the creation of an adminis-
trative court with restricted jurisdiction. Consider the environmen-
tal court proposal that arose as environmental law burst on the
scene in the 1970s. 21 5 The proposal died after the Nixon adminis-
tration persuasively objected that the jurisdiction of any specialized
court should be broad enough to reduce special interest pressure on
appointments, to avoid judicial overfamiliarity with the issues and
the litigants, and to keep the court's prestige high. 216 We should
not mourn the environmental court idea or its analogues. Regula-
tion in fields such as environmental quality, nuclear safety, labor
relations, and occupational health and safety leads individuals to
align themselves with one side or another. A specialized court as-
signed to any of these fields would probably suffer from wars over
appointments and cynicism about decisions. The fact that agencies
such as EPA and OSHA have jurisdiction over many industries is
not likely to matter very much. The relevant political disposi-
tions-favoring the environment or growth, workers or manage-
ment--could still be sought in nominees and could be expected to
transcend particular industries affected by the agency.
2. The Nature of an Administrative Court
An administrative court with wide review jurisdiction could
capture some advantages and avoid some disadvantages of speciali-
zation. First, even though administrative cases are not a major por-
tion of federal court caseloads, a specialized court with broad
jurisdiction would maximize the relief provided. The offsetting dis-
advantage is that the potential for judges to develop substantive ex-
pertise in particular programs diminishes as the court's jurisdiction
broadens. Still, there are similarities, often close ones, among fed-
eral programs. Congress, pressed for time, often borrows yester-
214. See id. at 78-82 for an outline but not an endorsement of such a scheme.
215. Legislation mandated a study. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 9, 86 Stat. 816, 899 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)). See Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environ-
mental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
216. PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT ON THE FEA-
SIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM (1973); see also
Hines & Nathanson, Preliminary Analysis of Environmental Court Proposal Suggested
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, reprinted in PRESI-
DENT supra, app. C.
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day's approach for today's statute.217 For example, regulatory
schemes often follow a "cooperative federalism" model; entitlement
programs also have parallel structures. Moreover, there is a rapidly
expanding body of literature on such generally applicable subjects
as statutory interpretation 218 and theories of regulation. 219 Finally,
restricted expertise has its advantages for a court-a certain dis-
tance from the agency and its programs is desirable. Somewhere
there is a happy medium between knowledge and coziness.
The APA's standards for substantive review require courts to
determine whether formal agency adjudications are supported by
"substantial evidence," or whether rulemaking and informal adjudi-
cations are "arbitrary [or] capricious. ' 220 These standards are diffi-
cult to apply confidently-the subtleties involved have spawned a
voluminous literature.221 Reading or deciding a lot of cases seems
to be the only way to grasp these terms of art. Thus, a specialized
court could bring valuable expertise to administrative law.
In addition to the subtleties attending the APA's review stan-
dards, special difficulties arise in reviewing technically based regula-
tory decisions. I touched on this topic above in conjunction with
the D.C. Circuit's struggles to develop methods to review such pro-
grams. A specialized court could concentrate the benefits of such a
process of trial and error and Congress could provide it technical
assistance that other courts do not need.
On the procedural side, gains from specialization appear to be
substantial. Insights about process that are gained under one pro-
gram often transfer readily to another.222 Although the APA's pro-
cedures are relatively simple and straightforward, after more than
forty years of interpretation the spare text of the statute has accu-
mulated a considerable body of case law that applies to most agen-
cies. There are other government-wide statutes that appear
regularly in administrative litigation, such as the Freedom of Infor-
217. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1387
(1988)), were closely modeled on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
218. E.g., W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
569-828 (1988).
219. See Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and
Synthesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (R. Noll ed. 1985).
220. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), (E) (1988).
221. For example, our casebook devotes about 60 pages to the scope of review, and
many later pages consider refinements. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF,
supra note 31, at 141-200. The effect is to exhaust the students but not the topic.
222. See Nathanson, supra note 211, at 1013.
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mation Act, 2 2 3 the Privacy Act,2 2 4 the Government in the Sunshine.
Act,2 2 5 and the Equal Access to Justice Act.226 Also, the frame-
work for constitutional due process analysis is universal. 227  m
A government-wide administrative court should be able to
avoid problems in the appointments process. Ranging over many
agencies and industries, the court would consider a rich mix of is-
sues. The simplest available litmus tests for appointees would prob-
ably be whether they were favorable or hostile to the government or
to regulation, but at this level of generality such an inquiry ap-
proaches the usual consideration of general political orientation.
Also, the subject matter should be interesting and important
enough to attract highly able nominees, as the roster of the D.C.
Circuit confirms.
Another primary advantage of a general administrative court
would be its contribution to uniform national law. Exclusive venue
could produce clearer legal doctrine by reducing the cacophony of
judicial voices articulating it. Eventually, litigation should diminish
as counseling and settlement become less uncertain. Doctrinal dis-
tortions that have resulted from decentralized review could evapo-
rate. Agency nonacquiescence and private forum shopping could be
squelched.
A cost of concentrated review would be loss of the opportunity
for issues to percolate through various courts. Still, the difficulties
of obtaining consistency within a circuit allow some percolation
even there. The Supreme Court might even find it easier to monitor
a single font of administrative law rather than thirteen, although the
signaling effect of splits in the circuits would be lost. Certainly the
Court has proved its capacity to supervise the D.C. Circuit closely.
Jurisdictional overlap between an administrative court and
others would be difficult to eliminate entirely (for example, for con-
stitutional issues). The critical jurisdictional need is to centralize
interpretation of each affected agency's organic statute, because that
is where disuniformity problems arise. Here, overlap can be mini-
mized by ensuring that jurisdiction over all suits in which issues
about administration regularly arise-pre-enforcement challenges,
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). See generally Robinson, Access to Government Informa-
tion: The American Experience, 14 FED. L. REV. 35 (1983).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
225. Id. § 552(b) (1988).
226. Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504
& 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988)). See generally Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 229 (1987).
227. Currie & Goodman, supra note 202, at 73-74.
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direct appeals, and enforcement defenses-is conferred on one
court. As we saw with the EPA, separating review of the various
stages of agency action can create clashing judicial perspectives on
administrative problems, hampering the formation of sound law
and policy. A centralizing statute should refer specifically to the
particular agencies and actions that are included.
Issues within a specialized forum's competence that arise in
other litigation, for example as defenses, can be shunted to it. A
statute now authorizes the transfer of an action that is filed in a
federal court lacking jurisdiction to the proper forum.228 Enacted
as part of the legislation that created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, this provision was intended to relieve jurisdictional
confusion in administrative law generally.229 Unhappily, it has not
fully succeeded in resolving jurisdictional problems even within the
CAFC. That court has taken a cautious view of its own jurisdic-
tion, thereby allowing cases raising issues pertinent to it to remain
in others.230
It would be undesirable, however, to bifurcate litigation by as-
signing administrative law issues to the specialized court and leav-
ing other issues elsewhere. Unhappy past experiences with this
approach suggest that the entire litigation should transfer or re-
main, depending on its center of gravity.231 If this approach is
taken, current statistics on the numbers of administrative law cases
would understate the new court's potential caseload, since some
cases not now denominated as administrative law would be trans-
ferred to the court. And some administrative law issues would re-
main outside the court's purview, although probably not a sufficient
number to pose a serious threat to unification of the law.
The greatest obstacles to creation of a specialized administra-
tive court, however, would be the added inconvenience to litigants
and the court's large size. These issues are best considered in con-
junction with the obvious candidate for conversion to an adminis-
trative court, the D.C. Circuit.
The exact size needed for an administrative court is uncertain.
The nationwide total of administrative law cases approaches the
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988).
229. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 11.
230. See Dreyfuss, supra note 193, at 30-37.
231. See Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 412-14 (reporting jurisdictional problems of
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals).
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caseload of the Ninth Circuit, which has twenty-eight judges. 232
Yet the D.C. Circuit's judges presently handle only half the
caseload of their colleagues due to the concentration of time-con-
suming administrative cases in Washington. Perhaps enough of the
most complex administrative cases are already in the Circuit so that
adding the others would not require a doubling of the court's size
for a numerically equal caseload. Also, the docket could be reduced
by shunting some high-volume district court litigation that usually
does not present programmatic issues, such as immigration and so-
cial security matters, to specialized fora. 233 But the savings from
that transfer would not be very great. Let us assume, then, that the
D.C. Circuit could become a national administrative court by drop-
ping the rest of its caseload and expanding to a size comparable to
that of the Ninth Circuit.
Several serious disadvantages would attend creation of such a
court. First, as I have noted, centralized review creates the poten-
tial for a court to become either overbearing or uncritical. The
D.C. Circuit is far more open to charges of the former sin than the
latter, but time can alter relationships in unpredictable ways. True,
a court knowing that it has almost complete control of an agency's
fortunes can become too much the senior partner, as the D.C. Cir-
cuit may have been to the FCC. On the other hand, repeat relation-
ships can build cooperation and trust,234 undermining judicial
neutrality. At the least, the new court could have a diet overrich in
administrative law-it would lose the generalist perspective and
leavening effect provided by the Circuit's other cases.
A second major disadvantage of the new court would be incon-
venience to litigants. Of course, the current concentration of ad-
ministrative law cases in Washington is partly voluntary, given the
usual presence of venue choice. Yet for some litigation, the incon-
venience that originally led Congress to provide venue outside the
District of Columbia would be manifest. If all litigants had to
232. In 1990, the Ninth Circuit received 6,787 filings of all kinds. 1990 AO RE-
PORT, supra note 23, table B-1. That year, there were 4,323 administrative cases in the
eleven regional courts of appeals and the D.C. Circuit. The Federal Circuit adds an-
other 1,466, for a total of 5,789. Nationwide, there were 40,898 cases filed in 1990;
2,578 were administrative appeals. Adding 40% of the other U.S. civil cases (or 1,745
of 4,364) to the direct appeals would total about 10.5% of the docket. Id.
233. See Bruff, supra note 201.
234. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974). See generally R. AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (explaining that cooperation is fostered by re-
peated interactions).
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travel to Washington, the rich would enjoy a comparative advan-
tage. 235 So, too, would agencies that tend to decide cases of small
money value, however important the cases may be to persons af-
fected. To alleviate these fairness problems, some circuit-riding
plan might be attempted, such as periodic sittings in a few major
cities. However, circuit-riding might require a further increase in
the number of judges.
Finally, a court the size of the Ninth Circuit must struggle to
maintain consistency. A court charged with promulgating uniform
national law would have heightened responsibilities in this regard.
As noted above, resort to limited en banc procedures can alleviate
but not cure this problem.
The disadvantages of overcentralization, inconvenience, and
cumbersomeness appear to doom proposals for a national adminis-
trative court.236 Part IV considers whether we can reap most of the
advantages of centralized, specialized review while avoiding most of
the disadvantages. Several innovative structures are possible. I
next consider three related methods to achieve partial coordination
of the administrative cases, in search of a system more flexible and
less subject to political abuses than is subject matter organization.
IV. A COORDINATING COURT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Any institution for coordinating administrative law should
have the optimum level of familiarity with problems of administra-
tion and law, the practical capacity to monitor administrative law
developments in the regional circuits, and the credible power to
mold a uniform national law (subject to Supreme Court supervi-
sion). No institution will discharge such daunting functions per-
fectly, but we should be able to improve on present conditions.
Congress could establish any of three mechanisms on an exper-
imental basis. First, the D.C. Circuit could provide limited en banc
reconsideration of any administrative law panel decision in any re-
gional circuit. Second, a special national panel of federal judges
could discharge the same function. Third, a national panel could
decide which regional decisions merit further review and could as-
sign them to limited en banc review in a designated circuit. I rec-
ommend this last option.
235. Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 421.
236. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 72-73 (criticizing consolidated
review of federal administrative agency orders).
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The three mechanisms considered here would have several es-
sential features in common. Any published panel decision in a re-
gional circuit that involves administrative law would be eligible for
review. Any party could petition; the government would be re-
quired to do so or to acquiesce in the panel ruling. The decision
whether review should be granted would require no materials be-
yond the panel opinion and a short and plain statement of its impor-
tance and deficiency. The power to grant review would be
committed to the unreviewable discretion of the screening court, to
avoid jurisdictional litigation. Review would be by a number of
judges representing the optimal balance between efficiency and sta-
bility of decision. The result would bind the nation, pending possi-
ble Supreme Court review.-
At present, there are about 5,800 administrative law decisions
per year in the courts of appeals. The number of petitions for re-
view might be proportionate to those now filed for en banc rehear-
ing of all decisions in the appellate courts. In 1985-87, about
thirteen percent of panel decisions nationwide produced rehearing
requests. 237 Yet in the D.C. Circuit, the figures were forty-six per-
cent in 1985, seventeen percent in 1986, and nineteen percent in
1987.238 Occurring at the close of a period of turbulence in the Cir-
cuit,239 the very high number for 1985 might be disregarded as aber-
rational. Even so, a figure approaching twenty percent is
significantly above the national average. The high rate may reflect
the concentration of important administrative cases in the D.C. Cir-
cuit, or may constitute an informal poll of attorneys' perceptions of
circuit homogeneity. If the latter is the case, the D.C. Circuit's re-
cent reputation for discord has produced procedural burdens for the
judges.
Let us suppose that about 1,000 petitions for review would
reach the court annually. If all were accepted, a caseload similar to
the D.C. Circuit's current administrative law docket would emerge.
Presumably, however, the court would control its docket as the
Supreme Court does, granting petitions that impress a specified
number of judges. In that way the court could view the emerging
landscape of administrative law and decide where to concentrate
review efforts.
237. Solimine, supra note 167, at 47.
238. Id. Other circuits also displayed substantial divergence from the average (e.g.,
the Third hovered around 25%; the Second stayed under 10%).
239. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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Such docket control would be not only desirable but necessary.
Not all panel decisions that displease the litigants merit review.
Also, a new reviewing entity could attract a much higher rate of
petitions than the regional circuits receive for en banc review. At
present, petitioning may be chilled by attorney awareness of the rar-
ity of en banc review.240 If the coordinating court accepted a sub-
stantial proportion of petitions, it would provide an incentive to
appeal. Moreover, an opportunity for forum shopping would arise.
A losing party trapped in an unfavorable regional circuit might like
nothing better than to escape to any differently constituted review
forum.
Accordingly, one should not underestimate the review court's
potential volume of petitions. The court, might somewhat reduce
their number by adhering to a policy of granting review only in
cases that present important statutory issues or an opportunity for
the court to deter forum shopping. Still, processing 1,000 petitions
per year would entail substantial administrative burdens, although
lesser ones than the Supreme Court endures.241 It would be neces-
sary to use staff attorneys or law clerks to evaluate the petitions and
recommend to the judges which ones should be accepted. This par-
ticular bureaucratic feature of the federal courts receives a bad press
nowadays; 242 it could be ameliorated by hiring persons experienced
in administrative law or having sufficient tenure with the court to
promote good judgment.
How many cases should the reviewing court hear and decide?
Each D.C. Circuit judge, burdened by large administrative contro-
versies, now hears about 115 cases per year. Mutually offsetting
factors suggest that this might be a fair estimate of a single coordi-
nating panel's ultimate capacity. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the court
would receive no relief from unimportant cases that can quickly be
decided. On the other hand, it could avoid the single most time-
consuming task in modem administrative law-searching massive
records to see whether there is sufficient support for an agency's
conclusions of fact and policy. The coordinating court should focus
on broader issues of law and process, which involve less drudgery to
decide.
240. But it is not chilled very much. There is a 13% request rate for such review
nationwide, even though the review rate is only 1%.
241. In 1982, the Court received about 5,000 requests for review. S. ESTREiCHER &
J. SEXTON, supra note 27, at 1.
242. E.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 36-38; R. POSNER, supra note 25, at
102-19.
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Disposition of 100 cases per year would quadruple the present
capacity of the Supreme Court to coordinate administrative law.243
Acceptance of one in ten petitions for review should allow the court
to control the most important developments in the regional circuits.
Some percolation in the circuits could precede the court's decision
of an important issue. Review capacity would not be confined by
the docket limitations of a single panel, however, if the coordinating
entity were made large enough to break into separate panels, or if it
were to assign cases to regional circuits for decision. If the latter
system were adopted, overall caseloads in the circuits would pro-
vide the ceiling to review capacity.
A. The D.C. Circuit as Coordinating Court
At the threshold, comity problems with designating one circuit
to review the product of others might doom use of the D.C. Circuit
as a coordinating court.244 The fear would be of creating a
Supercircuit, instantly reducing former equals elsewhere to Circuit
Judges, Junior Grade. Moreover, D.C. Circuit judges might feel
uncomfortable supervising their colleagues. Yet for four reasons, I
think these obstacles could be overcome. First, all concerned
should realize that there is a quid pro quo for the regional circuits-
the creation of a mechanism that could stop government nonacqui-
escence in their decisions and fundamentally increase judicial power
over the agencies. The government could reasonably be expected to
seek review in the D.C. Circuit or to acquiesce in a panel deci-
sion. 245 It is not realistic to expect the government to seek certio-
rari automatically. Second, litigant manipulation of the courts
through forum shopping would decline to the extent that the coor-
dinating court actually announced and enforced uniform law.
Third, the other circuits should recognize the real expertise that the
D.C. Circuit already possesses due to its semi-specialization. And
243. See supra text accompanying note 33.
244. I presented this idea to the Federal Courts Study Committee, which rejected it
on the grounds that incremental gains in uniformity would not be justified because the
court would be excessively large and costly. STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note
20, at 73. I analyze that objection below. See infra text accompanying notes 245-252.
The only proposal similar to this one that I can find is in Carrington, Crowded Dockets
and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law,
82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 605-06 (1969) (suggesting that a specialized court might have
en banc revisory power over a generalized one).
245. If the coordinating court denied review, the government could practice intercir-
cuit nonacquiescence as it does now.
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fourth, the supervision would be quite partial in nature, covering
only a tiny portion of the appellate caseload.
Additional, and perhaps insurmountable, political problems
would attend increased concentration of administrative review in
the D.C. Circuit, however. In the early 1980s, serious proposals
circulated in Congress to increase the decentralization of adminis-
trative review by placing venue in the regional circuits at the ex-
pense of the D.C. Circuit.246 Part of the "sagebrush rebellion,"
these proposals reflected a perception that the Circuit issued too
many "liberal" decisions favoring environmental groups and sup-
pressing development in the West. Today, however, eight years of
the Reagan administration have changed the face of the lower fed-
eral courts.247 The D.C. Circuit now stands in close internal bal-
ance. 248 By the time the Bush administration leaves office, the
Circuit may be widely viewed as conservative.
Because political winds are fickle, federal judicial structure
should withstand, not follow, their momentary direction. More-
over, although the D.C. Circuit would control the most important
aspects of administrative law development short of the Supreme
Court, it would not decide most administrative litigation. The re-
gional circuits and their district courts would do that, and would
retain a full opportunity to add their insights. To protect their
role-and their sensibilities-the regional circuits could be author-
ized to escape review in the D.C. Circuit if they engaged their own
en banc procedures. 249 Nevertheless, this proposal would inescap-
ably increase the power of an already powerful circuit, and might
well founder on that reef.
The size needed for the Circuit to discharge coordinating re-
sponsibilities is problematic but not insuperable, given the availabil-
ity of limited en banc procedures. Reasonable minds could disagree
over the optimal number of judges to use for an en banc proceeding
that would provide binding national precedent. One 'possibility
would be to use all twelve of the Circuit's judges. Yet full en banc
hearings have become very rare in the Circuit, as elsewhere. 250
True, the Ninth Circuit holds limited en banc hearings with a simi-
246. But cf Sunstein, supra note 41, at 982-85 (arguing in favor of centralized re-
view in the D.C. Circuit in a 1982 essay).
247. See Solimine, supra note 167, at 30.
248. See id. at 31; cf. Pierce, supra note 126, at 307.
249. Where a case involved important issues other than administrative law, this ex-
ception would allow the originating circuit to police its own product and enforce inter-
nal consistency.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 167-168.
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lar number of eleven, but that is a second best solution in a gigantic
court, and en banc procedures are still infrequent there. Since the
point of authorizing this procedure is to use it, a somewhat lesser
number seems preferable.
Nine has proved a politically maximum number for the
Supreme Court. 251 From a managerial perspective, the Court seems
reasonably successful at hearing and deciding the principal cases it
selects. It does seem desirable to have a majority of the full Circuit
to aid stability of decision, although the Ninth Circuit operates with
a lower proportion. A court of seven would need a majority of four
circuit judges to override a unanimous panel decision of three
judges in a regional circuit.2 2 Fewer than that would lack sufficient
clout to support a decision overturning the law of a coequal circuit
and binding everyone until the Supreme Court intervenes. More
than seven might require a substantial expansion in the D.C. Circuit
to perform its coordinating duties.
For the Circuit to discharge this responsibility effectively, a
modest increase in its size and a transfer of its other responsibilities
might be necessary. The transfer would be unfortunate because of
its cost to the court's generalist perspective. The Fourth Circuit
would be the natural repository for the D.C. Circuit's other cases.
Although the initial burdens of the new function for the D.C. Cir-
cuit are necessarily uncertain and might be substantial, their exact
extent would lie in the discretion of the Circuit itself. There is room
for some expansion in its personnel: adding two judges to the Cir-
cuit would mean that a limited en banc panel of seven would still be
half the court.
Better reasons for seeking an alternative to the D.C. Circuit as
coordinating institution lie in the perspective problems that any
pure administrative court would encounter, and that the Circuit
may suffer already. A primary virtue of a national panel of judges
would be flexibility. The panel's size and its regional balance could
be adjusted precisely and could change over time.
B. A National Administrative Law Panel
Proposals for a national court of appeals with a general juris-
diction have provoked three principal objections: that the court
251. No one seriously proposes increasing the number of Justices; perhaps the lesson
of Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan has been overlearned. For summary and
discussion of the plan, see P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
274-79 (1988).
252. ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 28.
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would cause delay, diminish the prestige of the existing courts of
appeals, and unduly burden the Supreme Court. A national panel
for administrative law should be able to avoid these disadvantages.
First, substantial delay would be added only by those cases that the
coordinating court accepted for review and that were ultimately
destined for the Supreme Court. Existing procedures for certiorari
before decision in the lower courts could be extended to allow the
Court to truncate activity in the coordinating court in cases of ex-
ceptional importance.253 The delay that would attend appeals ter-
minating in the coordinating court would be offset by the unifying
force of the court's opinions, which should eventually reduce ad-
ministrative law litigation. Delays caused by fruitless petitioning to
the coordinating court could be reduced if that court initially ra-
tioned access by establishing fee requirements and punished frivo-
lous petitions by imposing costs. 254
Second, the threat to circuit court prestige that would be posed
by part-time, specialized review of a limited portion of appellate ac-
tivities is much less than that of a new, general tier of review. And
as I have noted, the coordinating court would benefit the present
courts by enforcing their mandates.
Third, the new court should. reduce, rather than increase bur-
dens on the Supreme Court. No new screening responsibility for
the Court is contemplated here. Indeed, the existing burdens of cer-
tiorari petitions would be reduced somewhat if the Court presumed
nearly conclusively that any case denied the coordinating court's
attention was unworthy of its own.255 To be sure, the importance of
the cases granted review in the new court would warrant close mon-
itoring of its decisions. But it is much easier to oversee those cases
than the vastly larger pool of panel decisions from which they
would be winnowed.
The actual contribution of a coordinating court to a stable and
uniform body of administrative law lies within the control of its
architects. First, the appointments process must ensure that the
court will possess prestige, expertise, and the confidence of the
253. Presumably, however, the Court would often welcome ventilation of the issues
in an expert forum before it took a case.
254. For a discussion of money controls over access to the courts, see R. POSNER,
supra note 25, at 131-39. Of course, there should be a provision for fee waivers for the
impecunious.
255. If the Court required petitions for certiorari to reveal whether the coordinating
court had previously denied review, it could identify petitions it would almost certainly
deny. The alternative of making such cases ineligible for Court review might raise the
objection that the Court was being stripped of docket control. See supra note 184.
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Supreme Court. A national administrative law panel could be com-
posed of sitting federal judges serving temporary terms, perhaps five
years. District judges could be included to provide their perspec-
tive. Rotating the panel members after a substantial period of ser-
vice (for example, five years) would balance stability of decision and
growth of expertise against renewal of ideas and equality of judicial
status.2 6
The panel could be of a size (seven or nine) that could handle
the caseload while sitting en banc. Alternatively, a somewhat larger
court could sit in panels of five or seven, depending on the mini-
mum number thought appropriate for overriding a regional panel
decision. A panel too large to hear all cases en banc could make
many more decisions than a smaller one, but would have consis-
tency problems of its own, necessitating at least occasional resort to
full en banc procedures.
Experienced and distinguished judges would have the best
chance of persuading their colleagues and the Supreme Court to
honor their judgments. If the panel has no claim to expertise, it will
lack intrinsic authority.257 Acquaintance with administrative law is
therefore required. Today's bench includes judges with varying
backgrounds in Congress, the executive branch, and academe. And
of course service on the D.C. Circuit provides an ample education
in administrative law for all its judges, regardless of their previous
experience. The statute creating the panel could provide that sev-
eral of its members be drawn from that Circuit.258
As some of the D.C. Circuit's unhappy experiences have
demonstrated, the national panel would need to be broadly compat-
ible ideologically with the Supreme Court to reduce friction and
reversals. If the panel is known to be in constant jeopardy of rever-
sal, it will receive little respect-and provide the Court little relief.
There are two basic strategies to this end. Even with a requirement
that several of the panel members be drawn from the D.C. Circuit,
256. A slowly rotating national administrative law panel hearing all its cases en banc
would probably be somewhat more stable than the shifting, limited en banc panels of
the D.C. Circuit.
257. R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 102.
258. If two or three judges of a seven-member panel, or three or four of a nine-
member panel, were to come from the Circuit, and if one of them was to be a district
judge, it might be necessary to increase the number of circuit judges by up to three to
compensate for the lost services of those on the panel.
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either one would be flexible enough to allow pursuit of
compatibility.25 9
First, selection of the panel members could be by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Placing the appointment
power in the same entities that select the Justices would tend to
produce roughly congruent results, depending on turnover rates in
both courts. Also, if the Presidency and the Senate continue to be
in the hands of different parties, there would be pressure to avoid
ideologically extreme appointments of any kind.
On the other hand, selection of the panel would differ from the
usual appointments process because it would assess the track record
of sitting judges for a specialized docket. It is much easier to pre-
dict behavior in such a situation than in selection of any generalist
judge, even on a promotion to a higher court. Given the heavy sep-
aration of powers component of modern administrative law, the in-
stitutional interests of both the executive and Congress would be
engaged. Success of either branch in stacking the panel would
threaten a fundamentally pernicious effect on our national law by
converting the judges from umpires to players in separation of pow-
ers controversies. At the least, the President and the Senate might
well find themselves at loggerheads, with each branch advancing its
partisans. The vacancies that have recently plagued the D.C. Cir-
cuit might be common. Over the long run, though, the President
would probably have the advantage, due to his party power in Con-
gress and because the Senate tires of repeatedly refusing its consent.
The natural alternative selection process is designation by the
Chief Justice. Because there is no assurance that the Chief will
prove representative of the Court, however, designation could be
with the consent of a majority of the Associate Justices. 26° The re-
sult should be a panel that the Court could trust. And the Court
should be able to monitor the panel's activity. The panel's diet, like
that of en banc circuits and the Court itself, should be important
and controversial enough to produce plenty of disharmony and dis-
sent. We might hope, then, that the panel could adequately coordi-
nate administrative law without stultifying it.
259. For example, if three circuit judges were to be selected, the appointing entity
would be concerned with their interaction and contribution as a group. The twelve
members of the D.C. Circuit can presently be combined into 220 three-judge panels,
allowing an ample range of choice. See supra text accompanying note 170.
260. See Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM.
U.L. REV. 881, 912-13 (1975).
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C. A National Panel Assigning Review to Regional Circuits
A more limited function for the coordinating panel could ame-
liorate concerns about appointments distortions and provide a
much higher review capacity than a single court possesses. The
panel, consisting of perhaps three circuit judges and two district
judges from the D.C. Circuit, could receive petitions, decide which
ones merit review, and allocate them to the regional circuits for lim-
ited en banc decision. 261 The panel could be selected by either of
the appointment methods just discussed. 262 Placing screening re-
sponsibility in the D.C. Circuit and decisional responsibility mostly
elsewhere should minimize potential tensions between the beltway
and the sagebrush. 263
A court's authority depends on its consistency and its ability to
elaborate and to enforce its decisions in later cases. 2 " Can alloca-
tion of review among the regional circuits meet these needs? By
scanning all the petitions for review, the screening panel would gain
a vantage point to see developing issues. The parties would possess
incentives to point out the forum shopping or nonacquiescence con-
sequences of existing law. Indeed, the screening panel could
dampen forum shopping in the initial filing of appeals if it were
vested with the authority to determine venue in cases of multiple
filing, or even in cases of filing in one circuit where inconvenience is
alleged.265
The panel could assign cases for partial subject matter concen-
tration in each circuit, without the exclusivity that attracts appoint-
ments abuses. It could follow existing distributions of subject
matter in an effort to maximize both judicial expertise and conven-
ience to the litigants. 266 Thus, the choice of a circuit for a decision
on the merits could be designed to promote consistency. As with
formal subject matter organization in the appellate courts, fragmen-
tation of national law would not be a disadvantage of spreading the
cases around the nation, since interpretive issues under separate
261. As with the preceding proposals, the circuits could use panels of seven judges,
except that the First Circuit would presumably use its full complement of six.
262. The panel's workload might require a modest increase in the size of the D.C.
Circuit by a judge or two.
263. Tensions might surround allocation of review to the D.C. Circuit itself. These
could be minimized by a policy of limiting that review principally to a set of statutes
known in advance, such as the APA and other procedural statutes.
264. See Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 37, at 1419 n.13.
265. For a review of venue problems, see Sunstein, supra note 41, at 994, 1000.
266. Convenience would be served to the extent that existing caseload patterns al-
ready reflect geographical distribution of certain controversies.
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statutes are independent of one another. 267 Also, there would be a
much higher capacity for decisions on the merits than a single panel
or court can produce. 268 Since there is no way to know in advance
just how many coordinating decisions would be necessary or desira-
ble, this flexibility is a prominent advantage of decentralized review.
Informal concentration of subject matter by circuit could also allow
courts to police an agency's compliance with past decisions and to
pursue the law's train of implications in related cases.
Random selection of courts of appeals to form national law,
such as that proposed by the Federal Courts Study Committee,
would forfeit the opportunity to develop expertise within the re-
gional circuits. The same is true of most existing proposals for in-
tercircuit stare decisis-a typical plan would require any circuit in
which a panel had created a conflict to use en banc procedures that
would then bind everyone. 269 Random choice of forum, by multi-
plying contributing voices, inhibits the articulation of a coherent
body of law. It is also subject to temporary fluctuations in either
the caseloads or the political composition of the regional circuits.
The former can cause uneven distribution of cases; the latter, fric-
tion with-the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the prospects for a new national court of appeals
with general jurisdiction, there is special need for a coordinating
institution in administrative law. To be sure, all the regional varia-
tions in federal law caused by intercircuit conflicts impose costs.
Yet to some extent legal diversity is built into our federal system-
an interstate actor often faces disparate state law mandates. So not
all intercircuit conflicts are intolerable; 270 when they are tolerable,
they promote the values of diversity and percolation. Yet federal
agencies are charged with administering their statutes uniformly,
and routinely do so in the face of intercircuit disarray. Without a
ready mechanism for resolving these conflicts, the rule of law suffers
267. Even partial geographical distribution of panel decisions can fragment national
law. See supra text following note 136. That effect can be eliminated by according
binding effect to the limited en banc decisions.
268. Where issues other than administrative law were present, the circuit giving lim-
ited en banc review could decide these as well. See supra note 249.
269. See, e.g., Note, supra note 83. But cf S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note
27, at 124-25 (critiquing such proposals); Baker & McFarland, supra note 26, at
1413-14 (same).
270. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 27, at 66; Leventhal, supra note
260, at 897-900 (1975); Sturley, supra note 27.
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as equally situated citizens hold differing rights and liabilities
against their government.
At the outset I emphasized the need for caution in institutional
prescription. In light of the danger that institutional change may
disrupt essential relationships between the branches and alter the
overall balance of power among them, I have sought the least dras-
tic remedies for the ills of the present system of judicial review.
